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Introduction 
 Some literary critics, in attempting to devise all-encompassing theories of literature, have 
incorporated the idea of the separation of the literary from the temporal.  If the analysis of literature is 
allowed to become bound up in politics, the critics hold, then it becomes subject to the whims of other 
literary critics, resulting in the breakdown of its claim to universality.  In my thesis, I analyze the 
literary theories of Joseph Campbell, Northrop Frye, and Rene Girard for their ability to address 
political concerns in literature.  In the movement from Campbell -- who treated politics with an active 
disregard -- to Girard -- who has given interviews directly linking his theory of literature with political 
events such as 9/11 -- I hope to reveal that a theory like Girard's successfully incorporating political 
concerns is not an invitation to subjectivity, but instead a crucial method of ensuring the theory's 
adaptability to the ever-changing world in which we live.  Another strength of Girard's theory is that it 
does not aim to account for all types of literature, but limits itself to accounting for the origins of ritual 
violence, a description lacking in both Campbell and Frye.  While Campbell's and Frye's theories hold 
up fairly well in application to the examples which Campbell and Frye choose, I hope to show that 
these examples are limited to a certain types of narrative: Campbell to ancient myths and by Frye to 
canonical Western poets (Milton, Shakespeare, Blake).  By examining other kinds of texts, such as  
science fiction narratives and literature featuring "anti-heroes," I hope to show how Campbell's and 
Frye's theories fail to account for important narrative modes developed in modern literature, modes 
which have lent themselves well to addressing contemporary social issues and conveying formerly 
marginalized experiences.   
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Chapter I:  Heroes, Holocaust, and Violence in Joseph Campbell's Hero With a Thousand Faces 
 
I. Joseph Campbell's Heroes: A Thousand Faces Counted, Several Others Absent 
 Joseph Campbell, author of The Hero with a Thousand Faces, identifies elements common to  
myths from many different cultures.  For Campbell, these common elements fit together to constitute a 
"Hero's Journey," the fulfillment of which is a psychic unity of the hero with the universe.  In the hero's 
triumph can be found an "ultimate boon" to humanity.  While this outline works, Joseph Campbell's 
universalizing theory of the hero must be considered incomplete, however, insofar as his theories offer 
no way to interpret the Holocaust, or an event like the Holocaust, as a manifestation of human evil.  I 
argue that Campbell's project in The Hero With a Thousand Faces -- to outline a scheme whereby 
various cultures have attempted to effect a unification of the individual with a concept of divine will -- 
occludes practical political dialogue by negating critical approaches to certain kinds of trauma.  Rather 
than creating a vision of an all-encompassing "hero," Campbell's literary theories in fact reinforce the 
primacy of a certain kind of hero found in ancient myths, while denying novel heroic archetypes, like 
the anti-hero, found in modern forms of literature.  By viewing elements in stories solely terms of 
universally recognizable symbols, Campbell denies such a political role for art, an approach which 
leaves the "Hero's Journey" vulnerable by default to majoritarian politics.  Although the "Hero's 
Journey" has been used as the basis for popular "quest" narratives written in the past half-century, I 
hope to show through an analysis of other kinds of contemporary literature (especially science fiction) 
that contemporary authors have rightly identified negative associations with aspects of the "Hero's 
Journey."  My analysis aims to reveal that the "Hero's Journey" only applies to a certain kind of hero 
Jesse Jones 
4 
who comes to manifests the will of his master and the values of his society without having engaged in 
critical inquiry.  This hero can easily become a propaganda tool, a useful idiot in the hands of those 
with ambitions of reforging their societies in their own image. 
 Joseph Campbell, in his 1949 work The Hero with a Thousand Faces, outlines an archetype of 
the "Hero's Journey."  The Hero's Journey consists of several stages, each characterized by common 
movements and symbolic of certain psychological barriers.  I will briefly outline the Hero's Journey in 
conjunction with Star Wars as a representative example ("Star Wars origins").  "The Departure" is the 
first phase of the Hero's Journey, consisting of the hero's movement from an average member of society 
to discovering his own powerful, unique, and occasionally magical innate qualities.  "The Call to 
Adventure" consists of society being faced with a problem, perhaps a princess has been taken captive 
("Princess Leia's message"), which will then become the goal of the hero to rectify.  Heroes may 
"Refuse the Call" to action ("Luke must help with the harvest"), temporarily failing to live up to their 
highest potential, and in this case "Supernatural Aid" may intervene to assist the hero back on his way 
("Obi-Wan rescues Luke from sandpeople").  With the "Crossing of the First Threshold" ("Escaping 
Tatooine"), the hero realizes there is no turning back, and in "The Belly of the Whale" ("Trash 
Compactor"), the hero becomes consumed in a mysterious world profoundly unlike the one he has left 
behind. 
 "Initiation" represents the second stage of the Hero's Journey and the locus of the hero's most 
severe tests.  The hero must survive "The Road of Trials," ("Lightsaber practice").  The hero "Meets 
with the Goddess" for additional strength and resolve ("Princess Leia"), but to be faithful to the 
goddess must face down the "Woman as the Temptress" ("Luke is tempted by the Dark Side") and 
achieve "Atonement with the Father" ("Darth and Luke reconcile").  Having demonstrated his mastery, 
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the hero reaches a God-like "Apotheosis" ("Luke becomes a Jedi"), and the goal of the Hero's Journey, 
"The Ultimate Boon" ("Death Star destroyed") then accrues to the hero naturally.   
 The Hero's "Return" occurs in a series of phases properly ending in the transfer of the benefits 
of the "Ultimate Boon" to society, as well as to the hero's conquest of his own internal psychological 
barriers.  The hero may "Refuse the Return" ("Luke wants to stay to avenge Obi-Wan") in a similar way 
to "Refusing the Call," the difference being that such a refusal is born out of the hero's new desire for 
mastery rather than the hero's old cowardice.  "The Magic Flight" ("The Millennium Falcon") occurs in 
conjunction with a "Rescue From Without" ("Han saves Luke from Darth"), and "Crossing of the 
Return Threshold" ("Millennium Falcon destroys pursuing TIE fighters").  The triumphant hero 
achieves for himself and for his people a "Freedom to Live" ("Rebellion is victorious over Empire"), 
often represented in secular texts by the hero's rise to the throne, or in spiritual texts by an ascent to 
heaven.   
 Campbell's theories, popularly known through a series of interviews conducted with Bill 
Moyers at the Skywalker Ranch, have had a great impact upon popular culture ("The Power of Myth," 
aired in 1988, one year after Campbell's death).  George Lucas cited Joseph Campbell as the inspiration 
for his Star Wars film series, which had grossed $22.2 billion by 2007, a total which includes the sales 
of books, video games, and related merchandise ("Star Wars' Galactic Dollars," Forbes).  Although J.K. 
Rowling has not said so herself, some have suggested that the Harry Potter book series is also based 
upon Campbell's Hero's Journey (Bailey).  In addition, popular Disney animated films from the 1990's 
(including Aladdin, The Lion King, Toy Story, Mulan) follow so closely upon Campbell's Hero's 
Journey model that it is probable that Campbell's theories influenced the production of these movies as 
well.  J.R.R. Tolkien's The Lord of the Rings trilogy makes another persuasive candidate for inclusion 
in the Campbellian pantheon.  So it is clear that Campbell's Hero's Journey model has enormous 
Jesse Jones 
6 
cultural resonance, serving as the source of entertainment, moral instruction, and spiritual uplift for 
many.   
 By now it should be apparent, however, that Campbell's "universal" scheme for the hero has 
failed to include a large body of literary protagonists.  Campbell has already excluded from his 
discussion "heroes" whose journeys end in failure for whatever reason, be it failure of the individual or 
society.  A well-known subcategory of such heroes are Romantic (or Byronic) heroes, who often 
assume characteristics and beliefs opposite to those held by mainstream society, such as Don Giovanni 
or Pechorin in Mikhail Lermontov's A Hero of Our Time.  Another category of "hero" not considered by 
Campbell is the comic anti-hero, famously represented by Miguel de Cervantes' Don Quixote or 
Shakespeare's Falstaff, who represent humor as a way of illuminating ironies in the societies they 
inhabit.  I contend that to ignore such literary types in an attempt to build a universal theory of the hero 
is to miss important and necessary ways of viewing other people sympathetically.  Censoring these kind 
of heroes may even be the first step towards dehumanization. 
 To be fair, Campbell has taken for himself an enormously ambitious project in attempting to 
explain the human condition through the way humans tell stories.  In the service of this project, 
Campbell does not confine himself to one tradition, but examines myths and practices from cultures as 
different as the ancient Minoans to modern-day Aborigines.  Watching "The Power of Myth," it is clear 
that Campbell is very learned about such cultures and has much to teach, but I take issue with his 
attempt to universalize his own understanding of what constitutes a "heroic," and for Campbell 
absolutely correct, way of viewing the self in relation to the world.  Campbell's universalizing approach 
becomes an attempt to fit vastly different cultural practices within the positive, world-uplifting scheme 
he has outlined.  This approach leads Campbell, I argue, to draw surprising and upsetting conclusions 
about violent practices, from Aborigine circumcision rituals to the Holocaust.  While some might 
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question my introduction of such a complex and controversial phenomenon as the Holocaust into my 
literary analysis, I am only staying consistent with Campbell's approach.  As Joseph Campbell himself 
attempts to substantiate his literary theory with real-world cultural practices, I believe it is not 
demanding too much of Campbell to introduce other cultural practices, no matter their origin, to 
criticize his theory.   
 
The Myth-Ritual: Frazer's Golden Bough as a Predecessor to Joseph Campbell  
"He was a priest and a murderer; and the man for whom he looked was sooner or later to murder him 
and hold the priesthood in his stead.  Such was the rule of the sanctuary."   
--James Frazer, The Golden Bough, p. 2 
 
 Joseph Campbell's application of anthropology to the study of literature was not novel; his 
approach follows in the tradition of earlier comparative mythologists which have come to be known as 
the "myth-ritual" school.  Among these works, paramount in influence upon Joseph Campbell was 
James George Frazer's The Golden Bough, a work of comparative mythology first published in 1890. 
Frazer sets out his overall approach thus: "if we can detect the motives which led to [the ritual's] 
institution; if we can prove that these motives have operated widely, perhaps universally, in human 
society, producing in varied circumstances a variety of institutions specifically different but generically 
alike" (Frazer 3).   
 In the service of this goal, The Golden Bough,  Frazer examines the practice of myth and ritual 
from many diverse sources.  Frazer cites numerous examples to demonstrate the validity of the 
particular points he wishes to make about the way humans relate ritual and myth.  For example, Frazer 
suggests that "the rain, the sun, and the wind... are commonly supposed by savages to be in some 
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degree under their control," then describes the weather-making ritual practices of the Russian villagers 
of Dorpat, the tribal inhabitants of the island of Halmahera, and the Omaha Indians, to name just a few 
(Frazer 13).  In this way, Frazer's argument proceeds in much the manner of Joseph Campbell in The 
Hero With a Thousand Faces when he attempts to substantiate a particular element of the Hero's 
Journey.  While Frazer amasses evidence in support of a claim, nothing in his argument makes his 
contention about the degree of control "savages" suppose themselves to exercise over the weather 
infallible.  In fact, rarely is the proximity of "ritual," the physical act, and "myth," the overall meaning 
of the act, as close as Frazer suggests.  The closest association possible between the two occurs when 
the "thing said" matches exactly the "thing done," which does occur, for example, when Frazer 
describes the spoken words in the ritual of a wizard of New Caledonia: "Sun!  I do this that you may be 
burning hot, and eat up all the clouds in the sky." (Frazer 23).  The wizard's statement can be taken to 
indicate his belief, or his hope, that performing his own ritual will grant him the ability to influence the 
sun and the clouds.  Without such a statement, however, it is impossible to tell what myth the ritual 
practitioner has in his mind when he performs his ritual.  One can imagine, for example, many 
alternative explanations for a rain-dance which appears, from the outside, to be solely about influencing 
the weather; such a rain-dance could be a leftover custom from a prior time when the tribal people 
believed they could influence the rain, or the rain-dance could be merely a display put on by the tribal 
leaders for show at a certain time of the year regardless of the weather circumstances.  So while Frazer 
and Campbell's claims on the relationship between a culture's practices and the mental state of its 
adherents are always ambitious and often provocative, they frequently overstate their own cases while 
occluding other points of view, for rarely in their work is any counter-argument presented or even 
acknowledged.  
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 Frazer makes a number of other assumptions which contemporary critics would regard as 
antiquated.  When speaking of cultures from around the world, for instance, Frazer characterizes the 
cultural practices he describes as "primitive" and those who practice the rituals he calls "savages."  This 
terminology of Frazer's is unhelpful at best, since Frazer makes no attempt to define what he means by 
"primitive" or "savage" or, alternatively, what his idea of "civilization" is.  It is perhaps not too much to 
assume that Frazer, a Scotsman writing in 1890, means by "civilization" roughly the British Empire, a 
myth prevalent among the educated class through Victorian-era attitudes on colonialism.  The 
Holocaust, however, a creation of European "civilization," upended this Victorian myth of civilized 
progress for many critics and authors writing post-World War II.  Other scholars can debate what 
separates the "civilized" from the "savage"; my focus is how cultures at all stages of development 
justify violent ritual practices -- those actions which kill, maim, and trample on the rights of others -- 
through myth.   
 The title of The Golden Bough is taken from the first myth-ritual which Frazer analyzes, the 
Golden Bough myth contained in Virgil's Aeneid.  In this myth-ritual, the priesthood of the lake and 
grove of Aricia is passed down in a series of ritual murders.  A candidate ascends to the priesthood by 
plucking the Golden Bough and then slaying the current priest.  Aside from the obvious violence within 
this myth-ritual, the myth-ritual has a secular political dimension as well: the presiding priest of the 
grove of Aricia was actually called the "King of the Wood" (Frazer 7).   
 That Frazer chose this particular myth is pertinent to my thesis, as the "Golden Bough" myth-
ritual features the main element which I wish to examine: the relationship between politics and ritual 
violence.  Frazer wants to answer two questions: "first, why had the priest to slay his predecessor? and 
second, why, before he slew him, had he to pluck the Golden Bough?"  (Frazer 6).  My thesis is itself 
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an exploration of the more generalized versions of these same questions: first, why do men kill, and 
second, why do they justify with taking another life with cultural practices?  
 Frazer does not occlude all politics from his analysis.  Frazer identifies one place in ritual and 
myth where ritual practice assumes a political aspect, the distinction drawn in some cultures between 
"magic" and "organized religion."  According to Frazer, "magic" is distinct from religion in that it is 
practiced by rogue actors who are somehow marginalized, yet despite their marginalization, magic also 
harbors the potential for effecting progress: 
  Hence, when at a late period the distinction between religion and superstition has  
  emerged, we find that sacrifice and prayer are the resource of the pious and enlightened  
  portion of the community, while magic is the refuge of the superstitious and ignorant.   
  But... magic, based as it implicitly is on the idea of a necessary and invariable sequence  
  of cause and effect, independent of personal will, reappears from the obscurity and  
  discredit into which it had fallen, and by investigating the causal sequences in nature  
  directly prepares the way for science.  Alchemy leads up to chemistry.  (Frazer 32) 
Unfortunately, Frazer's prediction that magic will socially redeem itself against organized religion by 
morphing into science is rarely borne out in practice.  History in fact furnishes us with many cases 
where representatives of "religion" have intruded to snuff out legitimate scientific inquiry; the Catholic 
Church's persecution of Galileo and the Scopes Monkey Trial are only two of the most infamous 
instances; later, I will examine a work of science fiction, William Tenn's Of Men and Monsters, in 
which science is similarly put "on trial" by religion.  While it is true that alchemy did "lead up" to 
chemistry, the transition from alchemy to chemistry was not as insignificant as compiling more data 
and accurately describing chemical process.  Chemistry and other fields of science as we recognize 
them today would not have been possible without a major paradigm shift, often called the 
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"Enlightenment" or the "Scientific Revolution."  Post-Enlightenment, science is far more threatening 
than magic ever could be to religious power, since science does not rely upon superstition, but upon 
devising cogent theories on the nature and origin of the universe.  Significantly, and contrary to public 
misconception, scientific theories do not offer themselves as authoritative; they are instead constantly 
in revision due to the rigors of honest inquiry and public debate, while religion jealously guards the 
"Truth" with a patriarchy of self-appointed high priests.  So to make progress in describing the violent 
potential of myth and ritual, I believe one must focus carefully upon the particular channels of power 
which experts of myth and ritual use, or attempts to use, both to harmonize the community and to 
justify their own existence.   
 
The Hero: Hazed by Barbarous Fathers 
"The problem of the hero going to meet the father is to open his soul beyond terror to such a degree 
that he will be ripe to understand how the sickening and insane tragedies of this vast and ruthless 
cosmos are completely validated in the majesty of Being."   
--Joseph Campbell, Hero with a Thousand Faces, p. 147 
 
 Joseph Campbell's archetype of the hero myth proceeds from Jungian psychology.  In his 
preface to The Hero With a Thousand Faces, Campbell states: "I know of no better modern tool than 
psychoanalysis" in his project of "uncover[ing] some of the truths disguised for us under the figures of 
religion and mythologies" (vii).  In Jung, humans tell stories out of "a need for mythic statements... 
which fit man meaningfully into the scheme of creation and at the same time confer meaning upon it" 
(Friedman 388).  As such, for Jung story-telling is a process which intimately relates those who 
participate in myth both with themselves and with the external world.  Campbell's theory of spiritual 
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progress through participation in the Hero's Journey thus can be seen as a movement from metaphysics 
to psychology, but in fact, the "journey" does not end here.  Upon closer examination of real-world 
examples of cases suggesting mediation between internal and external objects, Campbell's mythic 
psychology becomes inescapably political.   
 Campbell himself acknowledges just such a problem in his chapter "Atonement with the 
Father."  This stage of Campbell's Hero's Journey is perhaps most replete with uncanny "terror":  "The 
problem of the hero going to meet the father is to open his soul beyond terror to such a degree that he 
will be ripe to understand how the sickening and insane tragedies of this vast and ruthless cosmos are 
completely validated in the majesty of Being" (147).  Yet Campbell's project is primarily an attempt to 
reconcile, not repudiate, manifestations of human-inflicted pain which we would recognize as "evil" 
both in real life (the anthropological side of his work) as well as in texts and oral stories (the literary 
side of his work).  Indeed, evil becomes uncomfortably "familiar," for according to Campbell, the 
archetypal hero confronts pain and evil most directly when he confronts his father: "The hero 
transcends life with its peculiar blind spot and for a moment rises to a glimpse of the source.  He 
beholds the face of the father, understands -- and the two are atoned." (147).  Atonement is, for 
Campbell, the ability to look past this "blind spot," or as it is better known in theological debates, the 
"problem of pain."  The instances of pain which Campbell discusses, however, are not inevitable, but 
the direct result of specific cultural practices which, in Campbell's scheme, serve the project of spiritual 
"progress" by reconciling the human psyche with pain.  Campbell's reading of such rituals never 
attempts to justify why such rituals are necessary.  I will argue that this "blind spot" is only a blind spot 
for Campbell. 
 Examples of "atonement" which Campbell discusses in The Hero with a Thousand Faces 
involve brutal rites-of-passage ceremonies, which can be thought of as acts of corporeal punishment 
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inflicted by the group against the individual, or, in language more germane to the collegiate experience, 
hazing.  For Campbell, these Aborigine circumcision rituals represent a kind of "Atonement with the 
Father" in real life: 
  The culminating instruction of the long series of rites is the release of the boy's own  
  hero-penis from the protection of its foreskin, through the frightening and painful attack  
  upon it of the circumciser... It is night, and in the weird light of the fire suddenly appear  
  the circumciser and his assistant... With their beards thrust into their mouths, signifying  
  anger, their legs widely extended, and their arms stretched forward, the two men stand  
  perfectly still, the actual operator in front, holding in his right hand the small flint knife  
  with which the operation is to be conducted... one of the boys is lifted from the ground  
  by a number of his uncles, who carry him feet foremost and place him on the shield,  
  while in deep, loud tones a chant is thundered forth by all the men.  The operation is  
  swiftly performed, the fearsome figures retire immediately from the lighted area, and the 
  boy, in a more or less dazed condition, is attended to, and congratulated by the men to  
  whose estate he has now just arrived.  "You have done well," they say; "you did not cry  
  out. 
   The native Australian mythologies teach that the first initiation rites were carried 
  out in  such a way that all the young men were killed.  (emphasis mine, Campbell 138- 
  139) 
Afforded no insight into Campbell's attitude but his own vivid prose style, readers are left wondering 
why Campbell has thus chosen to memorialize this gruesome act of casting a young boy in the mold of 
a "hero."  The passage raises a number of practical questions which Campbell fails to address.  Why are 
such rituals necessary?  What if the young boy had "cried out," either in pain, or out of fear, or out of a 
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principled objection for being placed in a situation so disempowering?  Would he be any less of a 
"hero," to his tribe or, indeed, to Campbell himself?  Such are the questions which Campbell fails to 
ask, but which critics should ask when attempting to interpret the underlying politics of a hero's journey 
which relies so heavily upon a communal ritual to define the traits of the individual hero. 
 Campbell suggests that the modern world is worse for lacking such rituals:  "In fact, it may well 
be that the very high incidence of neuroticism among ourselves follows from the decline among us of 
such effective spiritual aid" (Campbell 11).  Yet, outside circumcision rituals, the modern world does 
furnish us with many examples of attempts at this sort of "spiritual aid" gone awry.  A public lynching 
defines individual and group identities through violence: is it therefore a form of "spiritual aid?"  What 
about Mao Ze-Dong's "struggle sessions," famously parodied by George Orwell in 1984 as "hate 
sessions?"  Through these kinds of analogies, we can begin to see how the notion of collectively-
achieved spiritual progress through communal violence is a particularly dangerous myth for Campbell 
to adopt, as one person or group's elevation comes most easily at another person or group's expense.  
The functioning of this collective unconscious through rituals such as Campbell has described can be 
credited with the institutionalization of societal regimes built upon defining the "other": for example, 
racism and patriarchy.  Additionally, a modern mythology devoted to "progress" seems particularly ill 
served by countenancing a return to practices of violent, public child-disfiguring.  
 The theme of communal violence in rites-of-passage ceremonies has been satirized in dystopian 
science fiction, such as William Tenn's Of Men and Monsters.  Of Men and Monsters is a novel in the 
bildungsroman heroic tradition, featuring an adolescent hero, Eric the Only, who undergoes trials in a 
passage to manhood.  Earth has been radically transformed, however, by the arrival of aliens; men 
scurry through underground tunnels in the position of mice, with enormous alien "monsters" stalking 
the surface.  Eric's tribal society of only 128 humans -- audaciously naming itself "Mankind" when in 
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fact other tribes of humans, known as "Strangers," exist -- is geared toward survival and remains 
largely ignorant of the larger world.  In particular, Eric's initiation rites are shown to be a farce through 
the priests' poor understanding of the technology used in the initiation; an oracle uses a broken record 
player, for instance, as an attempt to divine the future.  The tribal priests' mistaken application of 
performative language characterizes the tribe as anti-scientific, authoritarian, and patriarchal.  This 
society's farcical rituals act as a foil to Eric's real "rite-of-passage" to adulthood, which he chooses for 
himself by leaving his primitive society for a quest for true scientific knowledge. 
 In the first section of Of Men and Monsters, "Priests for Their Learning," Tenn indicates his 
concern with Campbellian theories of the Hero's Journey, by showing how the young Eric the Only is 
enchanted by acting out the role of a "hero":  
  To be a man--this was what it was like!  To go on expeditions like this for the rest of  
  one's life, glorious, adventure-charged expeditions so that Mankind might eat well and  
  have weapons and live as Mankind should.  And when you returned, triumphant,  
  victorious... you sang and acted out for the tribe all the events of this particular   
  expedition, the dangers you had overcome, the splendid courage you had shown, the  
  strange and mysterious sights you had seen.  (Tenn 408).   
The society of "Mankind" has a set path for anointing its heroes; boys prove themselves in dangerous 
raids on monster territory, to bring back the "Ultimate Boon" of food and weapons, upon which are 
sustained the tribe's meager existence.   
 As Eric the Only learns of the society's scientific intolerance, however, he begins to question the 
goodness of this social order.  The tribe of "Mankind" is surrounded by the monsters' "Alien-science," 
but the priests regard "Alien-science" as a taboo, privileging instead the far less effective, but orthodox 
"Ancestor-science."  Furthermore, the tribal leaders publicly execute those who pursue "Alien-science," 
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including Eric's uncle and mentor Thomas the Trap-Smasher, as heretics.  Through Eric the Only's 
social development, Tenn takes issue with the idea that an archetypal Campbellian myth-ritual scheme 
as a necessary precursor to an adolescent's socialization and psychological development.  Instead, the 
ritual shows how can have the exact opposite effect: psychological scarring and anti-social (because 
violent) behavior.  So Eric's choice between adherence to the tribal ritual and following the 
nonconformist path of his uncle is also framed as a choice between freedom versus conformity, and 
scientific progress versus superstitious regress.   
 William Tenn challenges Campbell's notion that an adolescent's identity can be determined by a  
community ritual.  At stake in the initiation rites is Eric's name, the source of identity in the premodern 
society of "Mankind."  In his tribal initiation ceremony, the village seer pronounces Eric to be "Eric the 
Eye."  The appellation is fitting, as Eric possesses a keen eye, not only in supply raids, as his new role 
would dictate, but also for the uncomfortable truths buried beneath the tribal leaders' obfuscation.  This 
is entirely incidental, however; the tribal leaders' process of naming the new men such as Eric is a 
performative, not a constantive.  This is a problem for the patriarchy of "Mankind."  In their tribal 
society of 128 people, where livelihood depends on risky raids on the "Monsters," they need specific 
roles to be fulfilled; however, a misaligned role can be devastating.  The tribal leaders recognize this 
problem, but their solution -- to pronounce a role for the individual at the moment of rite-of-passage -- 
is a failure for individualists like Eric.  The priests base their naming upon mystic evidence, rather than 
to allow individual choice to dictate the outcome; to question this regime is the most serious taboo, 
however, for in the desperate circumstances of "Mankind," individuality is abdicated to the leader in 
the name of survival.  The backward, anti-scientific regime of the tribe reigns unassailable and 
unchallenged until Eric chooses to dissent and live the life of an outcast, and Eric's nickname as "Eric 
the Only" becomes charged with extra significance.  The tribe's monopoly over its members' identities, 
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exercised through such communal ceremonies, is as antithetical to science, democracy, and 
individualism, yet it is fitting to tribal societies of the kind described in The Hero With a Thousand 
Faces, as well as to the patriarchs and despots of the world. 
 In the modern world, the public ceremony remains the sphere of performative language.  Many 
of our society's most significant events proceed by performative language: marriages depend upon the 
authority of a clergyman to pronounce the couple "man and wife," law cases depend upon the oral 
delivery of a verdict -- "guilty" or "not guilty" -- by jury or judge, and U.S. presidents are sworn into 
office on the Holy Bible.  Such uses are not typically tyrannical, as a degree of consent is involved: 
husband and wife agree to be married with a performative utterance of their own: "I do," citizens 
choose their president by popular consent; a condemned criminal may appeal the verdict if she has 
grounds to believe the legal proceedings were invalid.  The ceremonial power which performative 
language wields when consent has not been properly gained, however, means that the acts undertaken 
by performative language should be regarded critically.  Performative language in rites-of-passage 
rituals in Tenn's view do not necessarily result in progress for the individual and society, as Campbell 
would claim, but instead can be used as a tool of oppression which the strongest may use against the 
weakest members of society.  In Of Men and Monsters, William Tenn forces readers to question the 
authority of those in society who are entrusted with such communal power.  
 In his Hero with a Thousand Faces, Campbell has cited violent rites-of-passage rituals as one 
part of his Hero's Journey's movement toward spiritual fulfillment.  Moving from Campbell's Jungian 
psychology to the field of politics, as I believe we must if literature is to be treated with just such an 
real-world oriented and interdisciplinary approach, Campbell's silence and even celebration of such 
rituals incriminates his Hero's Journey theory as fundamentally incompatible with modern ideas of 
natural rights.   
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Heroic Crimes: Campbell Beyond Anti-Semitism 
"What about the six million that were gassed during World War II?" 
[Joseph] Campbell shrugged and responded, "That's your problem." 
  --Exchange between Joseph Campbell and a student at a lecture (Friedman 397) 
 
 Hazing is one particular type of communal violence against the individual.  One could argue 
that hazing is not a kind of communal violence worth repudiating, as the individual participates 
willingly in such activities in order to gain admission to an inner circle -- valid, perhaps, for fraternity 
hazings, but invalid for mandatory circumcision rituals of the type described above.  A much more 
serious problem, however, is assessed by crimes committed by the collective against the individual 
without the individual's consent, a dilemma symbolically represented most famously (and in most 
extreme fashion) in the Holocaust.  Indeed, political controversy has emerged when scholars of 
Campbell discuss the relation of Campbell's theories to his anti-Semitism.  Two articles in the Journal 
of the American Academy of Religion, by Maurice Friedman and Robert Segal, frame the question of 
Joseph Campbell's anti-Semitism against his ideas about the hero's journey.   
 Maurice Friedman examines the myth of progress, personal and historical, which underwrites 
Campbell's hero's journey.  Central to Friedman's critique is the idea of a "touchstone of reality," a 
historical event that psychologically shapes a person's worldview.  Contrasting Campbell with those 
who have not heard of the Holocaust or even Nazi sympathizers who willfully deny it, Friedman makes 
the surprising claim that Campbell's "universalist approach to mythology" precludes his finding in the 
Holocaust a touchstone of reality.  As evidence for the claim, Friedman quotes Campbell's response to a 
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story of German novelist Thomas Mann, whose "blue-eyed Hans and blond Ingeborg" were 
reappropriated "under Hitler, into what [Mann] could only name and describe as depraved monsters":   
  There is a deep and terrible mystery here, which we perhaps cannot, or possibly will  
  not, comprehend; yet which will have to be assimilated if we are to meet such a test.   
  For love is exactly as strong as life.  And when life produces what the intellect names  
  evil, we may enter into righteous battle, contending 'from loyalty of heart': however, if  
  the principle of love (Christ's 'Love your enemies!') is lost thereby, our humanity too will 
  be lost.  (Campbell 1972, 173) 
Although he calls it a "deep and terrible mystery," Campbell here has failed to address directly the 
moral and political implications of the re-appropriation of heroic symbols to Nazi ideology, ducking the 
question by insisting that the only way to retain humanity is to unconditionally "love" those who seek 
to destroy it.  Friedman indicates that Campbell belongs to those who "will not comprehend such a 
'mystery'" and it is easy to see why (Friedman 390).  Although this statement of Campbell's appears as 
one of his trademark generalizations, not as an attack on Judaism specifically, Campbell's troubling 
neutrality here will become central to my discussion of The Iron Dream, a work of satirical SF which 
makes manifest the inability of a Campbellian hero to confront or even identify Nazi Germany. 
 For Friedman, an American Jew who has found in the Holocaust a "touchstone of reality," 
history does not "prove that progress is inevitable"; instead, the Holocaust shows itself as a sign that the 
condition of humanity may be ruptured by historical events (Friedman 388).  I would add that those 
who claim to stand for the heroic model of "historical progress" are most susceptible to committing acts 
of violence themselves, or failing to speak out in defense of those whose rights are being systematically 
violated.  Campbell is in this sense not so far removed philosophically from the proverbial German 
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citizen for whom it would have been impossible to imagine what horrors were being committed by 
Nazi "heroes" just outside of town.   
 Campbell scholar Robert Segal refuses Friedman's thesis that Campbell's blindness to the 
Holocaust stems from theoretical commitments, arguing instead that Campbell's "sheer anti-Semitism" 
is the sole factor determining his blindness to the Holocaust.  As evidence, Segal discusses Campbell's 
criticism of how Judaism (as an organized religion) "exterminated" the goddesses in the mystical 
Jewish mythological tradition, leaving only "patriarchal" and punitive monotheism.  Campbell's 
approach here is not consistent, however, for he "allows for grand exceptions to the patriarchal, 
literalistic, and anti-mystical rule in other western religions, but he barely grants any exceptions in 
Judaism" (Segal 462).  Segal argues that Campbell's "coldness" exhibited in the introductory quote to 
this section "is not the expression of his universalism but the violation of it" (Segal 464).  However, in 
my reading the weakness of Campbell's theory transcends mere anti-Semitism, precisely because his 
theory aims toward generalization; the Holocaust is just one visceral manifestation of this blindness, 
visceral and useful as a shorthand because it has served as a "touchstone of reality" for so many.   
  In his monograph The Hero with a Thousand Faces, Campbell is never explicitly anti-Semitic, 
yet phrases such as "the Greek and the barbarian, the gentile and the Jew" (suggesting by analogy an 
identification of the "Greek" with the "gentile" and the "barbarian" with the "Jew") do nothing to clear 
Campbell's reputation for insensitivity toward Jews (Campbell 38).  This chapter does not attempt to 
resolve questions regarding the anti-Semitic tendencies of Campbell; I mention Segal's thesis in the 
controversy in order to indicate that I hew closer to Friedman's approach in targeting Campbell on 
theoretical grounds.  Although Campbell may well have been an anti-Semite, I hope to show this is the 
correct approach by showing how Friedman's criticism of Campbell applies to other cases of 
"Holocaust" in literature outside of Judaism. 
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 The Iron Dream, a science-fiction novel by Norman Spinrad, satirizes this weakness of Joseph 
Campbell's Hero's Journey theory, revealing how Campbell's notion of communal spiritual "progress" 
can easily become, when viewed from the victim's perspective, an invitation to infinite regress: a 
vehicle for fascist ideas and an accessory to the Holocaust.  
 Norman Spinrad stated that The Iron Dream was a critique of Joseph Campbell's Hero's 
Journey.  The novel also satirizes the genres of "sword and sorcery" science fiction and fantasy 
narratives which pitted a pure and virtuous human race against armies of degenerate aliens or trolls.  
Spinrad intended to show how easily these authors' fantasies could take the form of the ideas of Nazi 
Germany.  The Iron Dream thus reduces the tropes of a particular heroic myth -- the mode of 
storytelling which, according to Aristotle, most ennobles its protagonist -- to satire, the form of 
storytelling which most ridicules its protagonist.   
 The title of Hitler's novel-within-the-novel -- "Lord of the Swastika" -- marks The Iron Dream 
as a satire.  If readers are still unsure, they will soon discover Spinrad's tongue-in-cheek attitude as they  
contend with heroic yet cringe-inducing descriptions of Feric Jaggar.  Jaggar is both a stand-in for the 
historical Hitler, the self-authoring hero of the novel, and is, according to the novel, an exemplary 
"Trueman."  Jaggar -- blonde, blue-eyed, tall, muscular, just like Thomas Mann's Hans and Ingeborg -- 
possesses an unmatched intuition for sensing the presence of the genetically impure "Dominators" 
which have infiltrated Jaggar's country of Helder.  These "Dominators," controlling the minds of Helder 
citizens through mental patterns, represent Hitler's paranoid prejudices about the supposedly subversive 
role Jews played in German society.   
 Many elements of Jaggar's journey in The Iron Dream echo Joseph Campbell's archetypal 
schema for the hero's journey.  Jaggar "Crosses the Threshold" into his heroic journey when he crosses 
the border from Borgravia into Helder, just as the historical Hitler moved from Austria to Germany as 
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he gave up his average life as an artist to undertake a more fateful career as political agitator.  Jaggar 
begins his quest alone, but through a series of successful speeches and trials, builds a following.  
Following a "Road of Trials" with a biker gang, Jaggar receives the Great Truncheon of Helder, the 
"Ultimate Boon" which marks him with the destiny to rule the people of Helder, just as King Arthur 
received Excalibur from the Lady in the Lake.  The only role of Campbell's hero which Jaggar never 
performs is to "Refuse the Call" to be a hero, so unshakable is Jaggar's conviction that only he can 
liberate Helder from the grip of the Dominators, a task which he achieves after much heroic struggle in 
style suggestive of a foregone conclusion.  Unlike the historical Hitler, Jaggar transforms his society 
and achieves his "Thousand-Year Reich" by eliminating the Dominators once and for all.  The joy 
readers of The Iron Dream have been conditioned to feel for Jaggar as a result of being saturated in a  
universe full of Campellian stories clashes with with the horror readers feel as they imagine what 
Hitler's triumph as a "hero" of Nazi Germany would have meant for the real world. 
 Dr. Walpole, in a faux-critical essay appended to "Lord of the Swastika," takes the role of an 
ideal naive reader of "Lord of the Swastika."  While taking issue with the extensive passages glorifying 
the slaughter of genetically disfigured mutants, Walpole qualifies his disgust with a reminder that 
science fiction is pure fantasy and an assertion that the events in the novel "can't happen here."  Yet the 
reader of The Iron Dream, informed with the historical knowledge of World War II, understands that an 
author's personal fantasies are not worthy of such facile dismissal, for the story of "Lord of the 
Swastika" could in fact happen anywhere.  In The Iron Dream, Spinrad shows how Campbell's theory 
of the hero can produce a powerful story, yet at the same time also be abused to promote a horrific 
cause.  As such, Spinrad suggests that readers themselves must act as critics when evaluating new 
language of the heroic type, rather than assuming that all that occurs under a Campellian heroic 
structure will result in spiritual progress for the individual and community. 
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 For Campbell, the hero's journey ends with a psychological merging of the self and the 
universal, and achievement of political utopia.  Campbell does not discuss, however, of how a hero's 
triumph can actually create and reinforce categories of "self" and "other," a distinction which shines 
through in virtually every page of The Iron Dream.  As such, Campbell's Hero's Journey can offer no 
assistance in interpreting acts of ritual violence committed by so-called "heroes."
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Chapter II: Occluded Politics in Northrop Frye's Inter-Textual Universe 
 
Politics in the Anatomy of Criticism: Discontinuity within the "Unified Whole" 
History is literary history, and in Frye's version it has no place for discontinuity.  No historical event -- 
not the life and death of Jesus or the Holocaust -- can fundamentally alter or break the archetypal form 
and telos of the 'great dreams of the arts'. 
--Lynn Poland, "The Secret Gospel of Northrop Frye," The Journal of Religion, Vol. 64, p. 518. 
 
 A literary text assumes a political aspect when it alludes, or directly relates in some way, to the 
social status of people living in the real world.  Formalism, a school of literary criticism popular in the 
first half of the 20th century, rejects such political concerns, along with well as details such as the 
circumstances of the text's creation, or the biographical information of the author.  These external 
factors are viewed in formalism as secondary to the form and medium of the work itself.  Formalism 
can be imagined as an attempt to analyze literature scientifically, or 'as literature' and nothing else.  
While Northrop Frye was not himself a formalist critic, his Anatomy of Criticism also sought to 
building a "science" of literary criticism by downplaying extra-textual concerns.   
 Frye centers his Anatomy of Criticism on the idea of "the literary experience," an elusive quality 
which can only exist at the convergence of the literary critic and the author, while containing neither 
party's own predispositions.  Frye acknowledges that an author's mastery of formal elements plays a 
role in creating this experience, but unlike a true formalist critic, Frye does not limit himself to analysis 
of these elements; equally important to Frye's critical approach is his emphasis on the need for effective 
reading.  For Frye, the critic's task is one of thoughtful 'recognition' and not of hasty judgement, an 
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approach which Frye disdained, and labeled as lazy and narcissistic when he identified this quickness 
to judge in other so-called literary critics.  Documents composed in this vein Frye describes as only 
useful in studying the "history of taste."  Thus Frye's Anatomy of Criticism also does not fall under the 
"reader-response" branch of literary criticism, either, but hovers somewhere in between formalism and 
reader-response, with slightly more primacy given to the author, who is generally more aware of the 
literary tradition, than to the reader.   
 As an example of the way Frye delimits his critical approach, Frye disparages critics' perennial 
search for the mysterious characters appearing in Shakespeare's sonnets as a task better suited for 
historians than for literary critics:  
  The questions usually asked about Shakespeare's sonnets, such as who was W. H.  
  and the like, have nothing to do with Shakespeare's sonnets or with literary criticism,  
  and have only got attached to criticism because, owing to Shakespeare's portentious  
  reputation, critics have acquired an impertinent itch to know more about his private  
  life than they need to know. ("Criticism, Visible and Invisible," p. 7) 
Frye maintains that the overall meaning of Shakespeare's sonnets should be a function of the power of 
Shakespeare's words, not of whomever Shakespeare had in mind when he wrote the sonnets.   
 Not only does Frye exclude biography from his literary criticism, but he also questions the 
value of various schools of literary criticism which reappropriated tools of critical analysis that had 
originally been developed to serve another context.  In this way Frye means to "avoid the kind of 
externalized determinism in which criticism has to be 'based on' something else, carried around in some 
kind of religious or Marxist or Freudian wheelchair" ("The Search for Acceptable Words," p. 253).  I 
argue that Harold Bloom, author of a foreword to a 2000 edition of Anatomy of Criticism, mistakenly 
extrapolates the disdain Frye felt toward the Marxist and Freudian schools of criticism to newer critical 
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schools such as feminism and post-colonialism, which were originally developed not to serve as social 
criticism (although they have also developed in this direction), but to give voice to other kinds of 
literary experience.  There is evidence in Frye's later writings that he would have been at the very least 
sympathetic to the literature, though perhaps not willing to accept the entire critical approaches, 
associated with the labels attributed to these various schools.   
 In The Anatomy of Criticism, Frye argues that in order to study literature systematically, 
literature must form a unified whole.  That literature forms such a whole is a major assumption of 
Frye's, which, like Campbell's assumption of the primacy of the Hero in The Hero with a Thousand 
Faces, is persuasive in the examples he chooses, but perhaps not applicable universally.  Consider, for 
instance, the way in which Frye scholar A.E. Hamilton summarizes his view of Frye's overall critical 
project: 
  The Anatomy of Criticism is neither a technique to dissect criticism nor the criticism  
  dissected by it.  It is not any superstructure built over literature, nor is it scaffolding  
  built around literature, as [Frye] claims (29); instead, it is the skeleton of literature  
  itself, one that structures what would otherwise be seen as a miscellaneous heap of  
  literary works into a single body with a human form.  It is not designed to interpret  
  literary works from some 'position' or 'approach' or 'basis,' but to allow the reader to  
  respond imaginatively to any literary work by seeing it in the larger perspective   
  provided by its literary and social contexts. (Hamilton 19-20) 
While Frye makes explicit his disdain for reading literature in a Marxist or Freudian mode, it is unclear 
what other types of "position[s]" or "approach[s]" or "bas[es]" Frye would exclude.  There is a danger 
within this approach in making the "literary and social contexts" so broad that they cease to speak of 
life precisely, which is ultimately the only way to speak of life generally.  One could argue that certain 
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"positions" are fundamental to the production of literature because they are positions grounded upon 
the author's identity.  Such an approach is common in the classification of books in libraries, or indeed 
in whole departments; for instance, literary works are often grouped by the nationality of the author, or 
by the author's race or gender, or by some combination of the above (female Afro-Cuban American 
literature, for instance).  While Frye would not likely argue against the practical benefits of the 
existence of such categories, he would likely dispute the attempt to turn these categories into stand-
alone critical schools: feminism, post-colonialism, queer theory, etc.  To exclude the formation of such 
schools would deny the existence of recurrent shared experiences and political beliefs, which have 
traditionally not been represented in the Western canon and arguably continue to be underrepresented.   
 If Frye answers 'no' to the possibility that new critical schools can branch out from new literary 
experience, then Frye's Anatomy of Criticism offers another incomplete theory of literature.  In this 
view, Frye's structure fails for the same reasons Campbell's theory fails: because Frye's critical anatomy 
does not include an apparatus which can be useful in situating literary acts within a political context.  
Instead, Frye repeatedly suggests that literature, comprising a totality, speaks the same unitary 
meaning.  It is my contention that the canonical Western literature analyzed by Frye -- including 
Milton, Shakespeare, and Blake -- only comprises one narrow subset of all literature and the meaning 
contained therein. 
 
Politics & Value-Judgments 
Value-judgments are founded on the study of literature; the study of literature can never be founded on 
value-judgments. 
--Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism, p. 20 
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 Northrop Frye uses the term 'value-judgments' to refer to a type of literary criticism which 
attempts to rank works of literature according to a particular selected criteria.  Frye refers to this way of 
thinking as the "X is a failure because" formula, whereby the critic is free to choose any statement he 
wishes to complete the "because" clause ("Criticism, Visible and Invisible, p. 6).  Arguing against this 
kind of analysis, Frye posits a hypothetical comparison among the poets Shakespeare, Shelley, and 
Milton under three different rubrics: piety, creative vision, and trueness-to-life.  Using any one of these 
three criteria produces a different ranking of best to worst poet: if piety is chosen, then Milton is 
superior, creative vision places Shelley at the top, and for trueness-to-life none can match 
Shakespeare.  As an even more frivolous example, Frye posits a critic who regards King Lear is a 
failure "because it is indecorous to represent a king on the stage as insane." (Ibid., p. 6).  Frye 
metaphorically represents a critic's tendency to judge a work by narrow criteria as looking into a 
mirror: gazing into the work of another and seeing only one's own prejudices reflected back.  Literary 
criticism which follows in this vein becomes, for Frye, a project of mere narcissism.   
 These value-judgments are perhaps not entirely meaningless, for they can help reveal a 
particular critic's or author's own dispositions; however, they do not contribute in any way to literary 
analysis, Frye argues, precisely because they are mere reflections of these prejudices.  In another 
exercise in the futility of value-judgments, Frye pens a fragment of a hypothetical book review from 
the 1820's wherein the reviewer praises the author of a book on Shakespeare for "for the first time... 
enabl[ing] us to distinguish what is immortal in our great poet from what the taste of his time 
compelled him to acquiesce in." ("On Value Judgments," p. 313).  Frye argues that such a critical 
statement says less about the author's book, and even less about Shakespeare, then about the prevailing 
critical values of the time; in this case perhaps the disdain many early 19th-century critics practiced 
towards the emerging genre of novelistic fiction, filled as it was with meaningless frivolities and often 
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penned by women (the horror!).  Frye is even more explicit about the dangers of using literary criticism 
in this way to reinforce social hierarchies: "Every attempt to exalt taste over knowledge has behind it 
the feeling that the possessor of taste is certainly a gentleman, while the possessor of knowledge may 
be only a pedant." (Ibid., p. 312).  Frye does not exclude, however, the possibility that a literary critic 
of truly superior learning may be qualified to speak authoritatively on subjects of taste.   
 Such comparative exercises can serve as a convenient teaching tool to readers, as Frye 
concedes: "I would of course not deny that teaching is a different activity from scholarship, and that 
many assertions of value are relevant to the classroom that are not relevant to the learned journal" ("On 
Value Judgments" 318).  Frye, however, argues that literary critics must be held to a higher standard 
than teachers, in that value-judgments should only follow from a critic's own knowledge.  As such, 
Frye stresses the importance of "recognition" as the "fundamental act of criticism" and of knowledge 
being the necessary antecedent to evaluation: writing "Every value-judgement contains within it an 
antecedent categorical judgement, as we obviously cannot tell how good a thing is until we know what 
it is" (Hamilton 22).  In these statements, Frye pleads for philosophical integrity against what he saw as 
groundless assaults upon valuable literature, while the examples he chooses suggest that Frye is 
fighting mainly against upper-class moral prejudices, and not, as Bloom would suggest, against the 
political concerns of historically disenfranchised groups.   
 I broadly agree with Frye's stance against value-judgments in matters pertaining to literary taste, 
within the formal areas of literature which Frye discusses.  Frye's exclusion of politics from his 
analysis, however, begs several questions concerning the broader application of his principle of 
refusing value-judgments, for political categories are constituted from value judgments.  This is 
especially evident in the treatment of violent crimes or socially disenfranchising institutions.  Are value 
judgments concerning a galvanizing political event in a work of literature -- rape, slavery, the 
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Holocaust -- for example, to be treated no different from critical judgments of formal elements?  I 
argue instead that the appearance of these kinds of symbols in literature demands a new critical 
apparatus, one that must be sensitive to the meanings acquired from the real-world.  Such a critical 
approach would eschew visions of a complete literary totality by including reservations for how such 
meanings are experienced by different audiences and the ways in which such meanings can morph over 
time. 
 If critics are instead to treat these symbols of violence objectively, then Frye asks critics to 
attempt to leave their pre-formed attitudes concerning an author's treatments of race, sex, class, etc. at 
the door the same way he asks critics to discard their pre-formed attitudes regarding the author's 
treatment of minor elements -- for example, the decorum for a king, or the author's chosen rhyme 
scheme. Frye's statements on values-judgments indicate no inherent bias against treating categories of 
identity as fundamentally different from formal concerns, but neither does Frye offer any explicit 
support for such a distinction.  So as we see in Campbell, acts of communal violence are implicitly 
justified as the means toward a higher spiritual end; in Frye, the politics thereof are simply occluded.   
 Frye might respond that it would be critical overreach to attempt to deduce any particular 
political belief held by an author from his work of literature.  In illuminating this attitude, Frye scholar 
A.C. Hamilton discusses what Frye terms the critical fallacy of "existential projection": 
  Historical critics of the 1950s and earlier were guilty of this fallacy in assuming that  
  they could abstract ideas, beliefs or values from a poem, project them against various  
  intellectual traditions of the age, and then discuss the poet's political and religious  
  views as reflected in the poetry.  Frye recognizes this fallacy when he remarks that  
  'we still talk about Shakespeare's acceptance of legitimacy, divine right, order and  
  degree, the chain of being, Christian eschatology, and the like, as though they were  
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  truths that he believed in and wrote his plays to illustrate, or at least did illustrate  
  incidentally,' and then adds: 'it seems a strange critical procedure to equate so skillful  
  a dramatic use of a theme with a belief in it which was mere commonplace in his  
  own day and is mere superstition in ours' (NP 41).  (Anatomy of his Criticism, p. 78)   
I do not dispute this particular analysis, but Shakespeare is only one author.  I would argue that in many 
cases, an author's political beliefs may be ascertained without 'existential projection' or consulting 
outside documents.  Witness, for example, George Orwell's anti-authoritarianism in 1984, or Toni 
Morrison's disdain for slavery in Beloved.  Even in cases where an author's attitudes toward societal 
practices are not easily ascertainable within a given literary text, it is usually assumed that literary 
critics have a legitimate role in attempting to answer such questions.  To relegate all studies of Joseph 
Conrad's attitudes toward colonialism in Heart of Darkness, for example, to the "history of taste" seems 
extreme, and would require discounting the influence which Chinua Achebe had upon subsequent 
readings of this novel, for instance.  Although Frye does not create a place within literature for any 
specific political concern, he does provide a general framework for understanding the way politics and 
mythology interact in "The Critical Path," where he sets forth the concept of the "myth of concern." 
 
Politics & Mythology: Myths of Concern 
When a myth of concern has everything its own way, it becomes the most squalid of tyrannies, with no 
moral principles except those of its own tactics, and a hatred of all human life that escapes from its 
particular obsessions. 
--Northrop Frye, "The Critical Path," p. 315 
 
 Like Campbell, Northrop Frye is generally optimistic about the role of myth in society and 
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literature and argues against the word's recently acquired pejorative connotations.  Frye even makes his 
own critical approach synonymous with the study of mythology, writing: 
  One difficulty... comes from the lack of any literary term which corresponds to the  
  word "mythology."  We find it hard to conceive of literature as an order of words, as  
  a unified imaginative system that can be studied as a whole by criticism.  If we had  
  such a conception, we could readily see that literature as a whole provides a   
  framework or context for every work of literature, just as a fully developed   
  mythology provides a framework or context for each of its myths.  Further, because  
  mythology and literature occupy the same verbal space, so to speak, the framework  
  or context of every work of literature can be found in mythology as well, when its  
  literary tradition is understood.  It is relatively easy to see the place of a myth in a  
  mythology, and one of the main uses of myth criticism is to enable us to understand  
  the corresponding place that a work of literature has in the context of literature as a  
  whole.  ("Myth, Fiction, and Displacement," p. 604) 
While Frye, unlike Campbell, associates his criticism with mythology, he is much clearer in addressing 
the societal dangers in the application of certain kinds of myth.  In identifying these dangers, Frye 
employs two dichotomies in his discussion of the role of myth: "myths of concern" versus "myths of 
freedom," and "open myths" versus "closed myths."  
 For Frye, a "myth of concern" is a community-unifying, totalizing myth, which seeks to explain 
the progression of the universe from beginning to the present-time and from the present-time to the 
end.  In addition to this universal timeline, the myth of concern will explain any "concerns" the receiver 
of the myth might have about the current state of humanity and the world.  Religion is the traditional 
repository of myths of concern; evident, for example, in the Biblical arc of Genesis to Revelation.  Frye 
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argues that Karl Marx invented the first wholly secular myth of concern, which he achieved by 
describing the progression of human history as a function of class struggle; Marxism as a myth of 
concern was taken up in the 19th and 20th centuries by many members of the secular intelligentsia as 
well as by revolutionary movements.  Similarly, Charles Darwin's evolutionary theory was taken up by 
so-called "social Darwinists" to explain and justify colonialism, the dominance of certain societies and 
races over others.  
  Political events in the first half of the 20th century were dominated by clashing of myths of 
concern.  The Nazi belief that the Third Reich would lead the Aryan race to assert its rightful rule over 
the world, for example, was opposed by the myth of concern that the United States must go to war 
against Japan and Germany to make the world safe for freedom and democracy.  While the 20th 
century saw an increase in the scale of conflict, friction between myths of concern was not novel; Frye 
explains the almost universal prevalence of anti-Semitism in societies around the world as the result of 
a clash between the dominant religion (Christian, Muslim) and Jewish myths of concern.  Myths of 
concern thus reveal themselves as frequently dangerous or militaristic, when they compete for 
dominance over society, but Frye notes as well the positive aspects of shared concern: "the myths of 
belief enable members of a society to hold together, to accept authority, to be loyal to each other and 
courageous against attack" (Ibid., p. 341).  While myths of concern can annihilate individual lives, for 
Frye they do not pose a threat to humanity.  Frye discounts the likelihood of one myth of concern 
asserting itself worldwide, for he argues that the larger one such myth grows, the more likely it is that 
other local variations would branch off to form their own myths.   
 A "myth of freedom," by contrast, concerns the survival and flourishing of the individual, 
independent of the social structures which confine him or her.  Frye credited Blake's prophecies as an 
example of a myth of freedom, which helped him "keep his head" at a time when many in literature, 
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such as Ezra Pound, adopted totalitarian political beliefs.  At the same time, Frye discounts myths of 
freedom for leading, in their most extreme forms, to selfishness, idleness and anarchy.  If myths of 
concern define the first half of the 20th century, then myths of freedom, such as "tune in, turn on, drop 
out" attitude of the Hippie Generation, or the "Gospel of Wealth" preached in many Protestant 
churches, have predominated in the second half of the 20th century.   
 Together, Frye's myth of freedom and myth of concern can be thought of as two opposing poles 
on an axis of human desire.  These opposing poles can be formulated in different ways depending upon 
which school of thought is favored for analysis: sociologically, these poles would be the desire for 
individuation versus the desire to become a part of a community; in psychoanalysis, they would be the 
id versus the ego; in an ascetic tradition, they would be the desire to spiritually transcend one's physical 
boundaries versus the desire for physical mastery over the self.  In literature, Frye's ultimate aim of 
study, these myths can adopt any of the above forms.   
 Frye also distinguishes between "closed" and "open" myths.  A "closed myth" occurs in a 
society which has been overrun by one particular myth of concern, wherein the society refuses to 
tolerate any competing myths.  By contrast, an "open myth" is not itself a coherent myth as such, but 
rather a "pluralistic mythology with several myths of concern competing within it" ("The Critical Path," 
p. 338).  Myths of concern would never completely disappear from society, but a tolerant society would 
allow adherents of multiple to co-exist peacefully.  This kind of society was set forth in the American 
Constitution, Frye argues, with its protection of freedom of religion.  In his discussion of the role of 
myths in society, Frye articulates a method for literary criticism to understand political questions within 
literature from a broader perspective, without necessarily taking sides.  This neutrality will become a 
problem for critics of Frye, however, considering the high degree of influence which the Bible has 
exerted as a myth of concern upon american noveliststhe Western canon. 
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God as Author: The Bible's influence upon the Western canon 
The Old & New Testaments are the Great Code of Art. 
--William Blake 
 
 In 1947, Northrop Frye published his first work of literary criticism, Fearful Symmetry.  In this 
book, Frye argued that the often misunderstood prophecies of William Blake could be understood by 
placing them in the context of Milton's Paradise Lost and the Bible.  Frye thus helped to situate Blake, 
who had been dismissed by previous critics as "delusional," within a larger prophetic tradition in 
Western literature.  Throughout his career, Frye continued to return to the Bible as a source for 
archetypes which he argued resonate throughout literature in the Western canon.  However, there are 
reasons to believe that the Bible's influence upon the Western canon owes less to its intrinsic value as a 
work of literature -- the lens through which Frye prefers to analyze the Bible -- than to the political 
control which Christianity exerted (and, to a lesser degree, continues to assert) upon Western societies.   
 The Bible is unique in Western literature in that it is assumed to be written from the perspective 
of God.  While the books of the Bible were written by multiple authors, these authors are, within the 
Christian tradition, assumed to have been directly inspired in their writing by God himself.  Thus, the 
Bible has traditionally been read as the word of God: absolute, incontrovertible.  While this view has 
faded in importance for modern literary critics, its influence upon centuries of Christian authors and 
critics should not be discounted. A secular critic, Frye himself remains a proponent of this traditional 
view; although he does not literally view the Bible as the product of one author, he nonetheless 
analyzes the Bible as one cohesive whole.  For example, in The Great Code, Frye compares the 
structure of the Bible to the U-shaped plot of comedy, beginning in Genesis with the paradisaical 
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Garden, descending into episodes of violence and political tumuolt, and ending with the ascent of the 
Christian faithful into heaven at the end of Revelation (Marx 164).   
 Supposing that to imagine literature as one cohesive unit is "the first and most indispensable of 
critical assumptions," Frye almost seems to suggests that if the Bible did not exist, literary critics would 
have to invent it (Poland 513).  Perhaps it is more accurate to say that if the Bible did not exist, then 
Frye would have to invent it in order to sustain his own view that Western literature forms a cohesive 
whole.  As critics, we do not have to suppose the Bible's existence; what is less clear is the project of 
tracing the Bible's influence -- and separating its literary influence from its political influence -- upon 
centuries of Western authors.  What I find not clear at all in Frye is his suggestion that all works of 
literature form a unified whole with the Bible at its source.   
 I argue that one aspect which can help distinguish so-called 'modern' literature from previous 
literature is the degree to which modern literature eschews the Bible as the primary source of symbols 
and themes.  I do not mean to propose this criteria as an absolute rule in modern literature; William 
Faulkner and Toni Morrison, for example, are two 20th century novelists who include many biblical 
allusions in their work.  However, authors in modern literature have also created the space for literary 
works to be founded on immediate experience and influence social attitudes through allusion.  The 
Bible may have been the "Great Code" for Blake, and for many others, but it is clear that the Bible does 
not form the "Great Code" of art for an H.G. Wells or a George Orwell.  How, then, to analyze literature 
which diverges from the well-worn path the Bible has trodden? 
 
Politics in Literature: Relating Fiction to Reality 
The fundamental critical act... is the act of recognition, seeing what is there, as distinct from merely 
seeing a Narcissus mirror of our own experience and social and moral prejudice.  
Jesse Jones 
37 
--Northrop Frye, "On Value Judgments," p. 313 
 
 In Anatomy of Criticism, Northrop Frye analyzes literature as a self-contained body of 
knowledge, a project of artists' collective imagination which need not comport with real-life 
circumstances.  In Frye's view, literature creates a parallel universe wherein texts communicate among 
themselves, building a collection of symbols and meanings which critics come to identify as 
constituting the "Western canon."  While Frye's critical approach holds up relatively well in his analysis 
of literature fitting squarely within this Western canon (the Bible, Milton, Shakespeare, etc.), Frye 
excludes the possibility that a text, or a body of texts, could split off from the Western canon to create a 
novel paradigm featuring new symbolic patterns and adhering to new myths of concern.  The result is 
that Frye's approach fails to create a space in literary analysis for determining the political import of 
such texts.   
 These tensions reach an apex in Toni Morrison, a Nobel Prize-winning American author whose 
literary work juxtaposes Biblical allusions with the political concerns of feminism and post-
colonialism.  One novel in particular, Paradise, enacts just such a desire to break free of the confines of 
tradition -- and moreover, a fictional representation of the schism from an old repressive regime, and 
the foundation of a new society with new leaders responsive to the political concerns of the previously 
disenfranchised.   
 Paradise takes as its setting the all-black town of Ruby, Oklahoma, founded by nine African-
American clans as a way to escape the oppression of segregation in the 1940's Deep South.  Ironically, 
however, the town of Ruby, though purportedly free, has imposed its own hierarchy, persecuting 
women of the "Convent," an all-female community which has retreated to the outskirts of Ruby.  The 
'myth of concern' at work within the heroic tales Ruby residents tell each other about their town's 
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founding is the myth of racial liberation, supplemented also with the myth of concern defined by 
extreme religious conservatism.  The men who control these myths of concern must contend with 
another myth of concern and source of political power, the more radical (because more peripheral) idea 
of female liberation, personified in the women of the Convent.  The women of the Convent are 
routinely implicated in a sequence of mysterious crimes, which are in fact terrorist acts of the male 
leaders.  The scapegoating causes the Convent women psychological damage and puts them in physical 
danger, but they find resolve and resilience in the shared suffering with one another.  In the uneasy 
dynamic between the 'founding fathers' of Ruby and the 'founding mothers' of the Convent, Morrison 
suggests that all communities are defined not only by inclusiveness, but also by exclusion -- the dark 
side of comedic triumph which Frye overlooks in his account of how comedy reenacts the coming 
together of society.    
 If the archetypes available to an author are already pre-determined, then, as it is sometimes 
phrased, nothing new can be said, because everything worth saying in literature has been said already, 
and likely more eloquently said before.  Alternatively, the poet of true skill contributes to poetry by 
phrasing, in Pope's words, "what oft was thought, but ne'er so well expressed" ("The Critical Path," 
291).  Toni Morrison's Paradise turns this traditional attitude on its head by positing an unprecedented 
fictional community which criticizes a community's common-sense reliance on racial solidarity, 
revealed ultimately as patriarchy.  I argue that, in our ever-changing contemporary world, it should be 
more obvious than ever that, while these old archetypes still maintain much of their traditional 
symbolic resonances, novels such as Paradise demonstrate how feeble is our grasp of the potential 
usages of these archetypes, and the array of new meanings which they can acquire.  As such, the idea 
that these archetypes, which we so poorly understand, can delimit all that can be said within literature 
no longer has a persuasive case.   
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 Consider the consequence of this old approach to criticism: that fictional texts which describe a 
set of experiences with no prior basis in the Western canon -- for example, slave narratives, feminist 
short stories, or anti-war poetry -- have no place within the pre-existing pantheon of literature.  Thus, 
the Western canon, written by and for the leisure-class of the bygone centuries, is often ridiculed by 
various schools of modern literary criticism (Marxist, feminist, post-colonialist) as being the literature 
of "dead white men."  The reaction of Shakespeare scholar Harold Bloom to these new schools of 
criticism, illustrated in a 2000 foreword to a new edition of Frye's Anatomy of Criticism, suggests the 
vigor with which the self-appointed guardians of the Western canon cling to an aesthetics-based 
method of analyzing literature: 
  All this is now quaint: Frye and his opponents have been folded together, as antique  
  Modernists inundated by the counter-cultural flood of feminists, queer theorists, sub- 
  Marxists, semioticians, and the ambitious disciples of Foucault, Lacan, Derrida, and  
  other Parisian prophets.  Aesthetic and other cognitive values doubtless still exist, but  
  not in the universities, where the new multiculturalists denounce the aesthetic as a  
  colonialist and patriarchal mask.  Poetry, demystified, has been leveled.  Elizabeth  
  Barrett Browning is taught more frequently than Robert Browning, and Charlotte  
  Armstrong has obscured William Wordsworth.  As we turn into the new century, I  
  wonder if I should summon up Frye at a seance, to ask him if he still feels that overt  
  value judgments have no place in criticism? ("Northrop Frye in Retrospect," viii). 
Bloom here denounces in one fell swoop virtually all of the important movements in literary criticism 
in the latter half of the 20th century; but he must admit that in order to denounce these new schools, it 
is necessary for him to abandon Frye's argument against critics making value judgments.  This 
admission of Bloom's reveals that literary criticism, once a project of, by, and for the aesthetic concerns 
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of a literary elite, has in the 20th century become democratized and, almost by necessity, politicized.  
While the thoughts and experiences contained within the Western canon are no less real for their 
authors' and readers' lack of diversity, the Western canon as represented within Frye's analysis, and 
within Bloom's jaded foreword, cannot and should not be construed as comprising a totality of human 
experience.   
 
Literature & Political Change: Frye after Anatomy of Criticism 
Whenever we read anything, we have two things to do with the words: fit them together, and relate them 
separately to what they mean in the world outside the book. 
--Northrop Frye, "The Responsibilities of the Critic," 1976 
 
 After the publication of his Anatomy of Criticism in 1957, Northrop Frye showed a greater 
willingness to explicitly address political concerns in his writing, and to speak forcefully against those 
in literature who gave support to reactionary politics:  
  The most intellectually tolerant of critics, studying the ideas or opinion of Yeats, D.  
  H. Lawrence, Ezra Pound, Robert Graves, or Wyndham Lewis, is bound to be   
  puzzled, even distressed, by the high proportion of freakish and obscurantist views he  
  finds and the lack of contact they show with whatever the ideas are that actually do  
  hold society together.  In the twentieth century an important and significant writer  
  may be reactionary or superstitious: the one thing apparently that he cannot be is a  
  spokesman of ordinary social values.  ("The Critical Path," p. 292). 
That Northrop Frye, one of the most-cited literary critics, would call out many of the most prominent 
20th century poets for their "freakish and obscurantist views" -- which included forays into fascism and 
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eugenics -- suggests a significant departure from the apolitical Northrop Frye of Anatomy of Criticism.  
Rather than delimiting his criticism to an analysis of the poetry of these poets, Frye here shows a 
willingness to employ his influence to call attention to these poets' questionable political beliefs, if not 
completely opposing these poets' coronation within the Western canon.  While Frye never abandoned 
his belief that literature should be analyzed as a "unified whole," he became more explicit in pointing 
out the degree to which literary figures' political beliefs can make them inadequate "[spokesmen] for 
ordinary social values," the kind of beliefs which Frye viewed as a boon to all humanity and not just a 
particular group.   
 For Frye such "ordinary social values" include, of course, the enjoyment of literature and more 
generally the celebration of life therein.   Although Frye cites overwhelmingly from highly canonical 
writers such as Shakespeare and Milton, as a critic he appears to place a value upon diversity; similar to 
his view of literature as a totality, Frye does not discount any particular writer or school of writers.  For 
example, in his writings Frye appears as an unprejudiced man unpersuaded by the early 20th-century's 
racialist classifications.  Frye's outlook surfaces with a clearer partisan bent in his defense of "the 
central English literary tradition as Protestant, radical, and Romantic," a reflection of his allegiance to 
Blake (Hamilton 61).  Frye felt the need to defend Romanticism from prevailing critical attitudes of the 
1930's, inflected as they were with "anti-Semitism, racism, and fascism... [and] Thomism based its 
study of literature on value-judgments," represented by the likes of T.S. Eliot and Ezra Pound (60-61).  
Frye is partisan in his inclusiveness of controversial, misunderstood "prophetic" figures, and partisan in 
excluding only those veins of criticism which themselves seek to limit and exclude.   
 Frye has noted many instances of value-judgments being used by critics to give a platform to 
their own narrow prejudices, and, in Frye's defense, during his age, and looking back upon the history 
of literary criticism, Frye may have seen the removal of critical prejudice as the main obstacle to 
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remove in a movement toward fairer criticism.  Frye's stance against value-judgments, however, limits 
the extent to which such value-judgments can actually promote rather than stifle diversity.  Even as he 
takes a more activist role as a critic in such defenses, Frye mainly limits his defenses to the purview of 
literature.  When Frye speaks beyond literature, however, he attempts to maintain the illusion of 
objectivity by claiming, somewhat strangely, that his political value-judgments are based upon "solid" 
ideas.  One candidate for a "solid" idea can be seen in the distinction Frye draws between sexual taboos 
and racial taboos:   
  The celebrated four-letter words raise few eyebrows today, because the taboo on  
  them never was based on much more than reflex.  The real obscenities of our time,  
  the words that no self-respecting person would seriously use, are the words that   
  express hatred or contempt for people of different religion or nationality or skin   
  color, and disapproval of such words is based on a more solid idea of what is socially  
  dangerous. ("The Critical Path," p. 313) 
The "solid idea" which Frye has in mind here is the degree to which such racial slurs threaten the "open 
myth" upon which American and, similarly, Canadian culture are based.  But while this anti-
discriminatory attitude is now taken for granted among modern critics, it is a relatively recent 
development in Western culture and literature.  It should be noted that the use of such racial slurs goes 
hand-in-hand with archetypal associations found throughout the Western canon -- of evil with 
blackness (Othello), or with Judaism (The Merchant of Venice).  Tracing the use of such derogatory 
symbolic associations could help reveal how previous generations of Western writers used the language 
of closed myths to reinforce religious, gender and racial cohesion.  By contrast, fealty to the 'open 
myth' may be found in literature produced in more recent times which either eschews, or works against, 
or deliberately re-appropriates such crass distinctions for dramatic effect, as in the way characters in the 
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works of Toni Morrison struggle to overcome their feelings of inferiority for being black and/or female.   
 Frye does not trace this ideological revolution in Western culture and literature; however, critic 
Jonathan Hart offers a more sympathetic reading of Northrop Frye, arguing that "even with [Anatomy 
of Criticism], we can witness a social and political Frye who always considered and confronted 
ideology" (Hart 160).  In his book review, Hart notes that during the early 20th century, when 
prominent literary figures such as W.B. Yeats, Ezra Pound, T.S. Eliot, and Paul de Man were dabbling 
with fascism, Frye's reading of William Blake gave him the means to clearly recognize Rosenberg's 
Myth of the Twentieth Century as a work of evil.  Frye repudiates Rosenberg's book as "a big Nazi 
polemic claiming that the racially pure come from Atlantis and so forth... I could see that this was the 
devil's parody of Blake." (Hart 162).  Thus Frye shows an awareness of the ability of the Nazi myth to 
seduce others by taking the form of Romantic myths.  But while Frye recognizes the book as a 
"parody," Frye fails to reckon fully with the way such parodies are able to pass themselves off to 
multitudes of readers as gospel truth.  The social ramifications of the abuse offered by such myths are 
potentially so dangerous that they deserve an account, one which could fit within Frye's theory by 
drawing a distinction between formal elements and political concerns in his conception of value-
judgments.   
 Hart's justification of Frye is centered in Frye's later work; however Frye's seminal work, 
Anatomy of Criticism makes no space for such political distinctions, and Hart admits that the "old 
view" of Frye as an apolitcal figure retains its persuasiveness.  So while Frye's Anatomy of Criticism 
provides a useful framework for categorizing Western literature -- and one which offers more diverse 
array of archetypes than Campbell's Hero with a Thousand Faces -- Frye also fails to explicitly address 
the way political dynamics can underwrite the mythic structure found in much of literature.  For just 
such an account, I turn now to consider Rene Girard.
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Chapter III: 
Rene Girard, the Anti-Hero, Christianity, and Communal Violence 
 
Mimetic Desire & the Hero 
 Rene Girard, most famous as the author of Violence and the Sacred, is an anthropologist and a 
psychosocial critic in the vein of Sigmund Freud.  Like Freud, Girard's attempt to explain the 
psychological origins of cultural practices is not principally literary, yet like Freud, Girard's theory of 
mimetic desire has often been applied to the analysis of literature.   
 In Violence and the Sacred, Rene Girard labors under the shadow of Sigmund Freud, the 
founder of psychoanalysis whose theories have had an enormous influence upon literary criticism in the 
20th century.  Girard acknowledges key similarities between his theories and Freud's, yet Girard sets 
forth an approach to psychology which differs from Freud's approach in a very significant way.  
Girard's theory of "mimetic desire" holds that much of human desire comes from the subject's rivalry 
with a mediator, not from a desire for the object itself.  This approach leads Girard to argue against the 
"Oedipal complex," which in Girard's view does not correctly account for how desire is patterned onto 
others.  Girard thought Freud's theory provided no compelling reasons to explaining why the original 
Oedipal triangle had to be replicated in areas of human interaction outside the unique case of the father-
mother-child relationship.  Girard posits instead that "we understand very well... why the mimetic 
triangle must be perpetually repeated, why it is a search for successful rivals" ("Superman in the 
Underground," p. 1168)  According to Girard, Freud has overlooked the role of the mediator in the 
triangular relationship: "Freud does not understand that the desire of the mediator is the essential factor 
in the desirability of the girl," (emphasis mine, ibid., p. 1167).  Let us more closely examine what 
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Girard means by these statements.   
 In Sigmund Freud's Oedipal triangle, the son's desire for the mother's affections produces the 
son's rivalry with his father, which can then lead either to abnormal behavior -- jealousy, or a desire to 
kill -- or normal socialization, whereby the son "identifies" with his father in the hopes of one day 
obtaining for himself another woman like his mother.  According to Girard, however, it is instead the 
father's desire for the mother which produces the rivalry the son feels toward his father for his mother's 
affections.  In Girard's scheme, the subject (in this case, the son) requires a role model (in this case, the 
father), whose desire for the object (in this case, the mother), serves directly as a pattern for the 
subject's own desire.  This goes beyond the Freudian idea of "identification," which Girard calls one of 
"a series of concepts ambiguous in definition, obscure in status, and vague in function" (Violence and 
the Sacred, p. 169).   To clarify the idea of identification, Girard notes one statement of Freud's which, 
in Girard's view, indicated that Freud "saw the path of mimetic desire stretching out before him and 
deliberately turned aside."  Freud wrote, "The little boy will exhibit a special interest in his father; he 
would like to grow like and be like him, and take his place everywhere" (emphasis in the original).  
This statement of Freud's includes no mention of the mother as an object, and even suggests the 
possibility that the "Oedipal" triangle does not really require a mother, but can be formed with the son, 
the father, and any other object which the father desires.  In contrast to Freud's Oedipal theory, Girard's 
theory of mimetic desire makes it possible -- but does not require -- that the son seek to adopt particular 
characteristics of his father, or else subconsciously carry with him for the rest of his life a repressed 
desire for his mother.  Girard's theory only requires that the son adopt his father's desires, whatever they 
may be.   
 According to Girard, "[t]he subject is unable to desire on his own; he has no confidence 
whatever in a choice that would be solely his own." (ibid, p. 1166).  The subject of mimetic desire 
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requires a mediator only as a go-between who serves to continually reinforce the bond of desire 
between the subject and object.  Were the mediator's looming threat of monopolizing the object to 
disappear, then the subject would have no basis for believing the object of his desires to be worth 
competing for, and he would soon lose all interest in the object, along with any reason to imitate the 
mediator.  Thus, in Girard's view, the mediator, not the object, is assigned a primary role; it is not the 
object's role to bestow affection upon the subject, but the mediator's role to bestow desire upon the 
subject.   
 While mimetic desire can easily lead to conflict between persons, in fiction and in reality, 
Girard holds that mimetic desire, once recognized as such, can be beneficial.  For without mimetic 
desire, there would be no force driving humans toward self-improvement, and no desire to adopt 
beneficial practices seen in others.  "Cultural imitation," for Girard, "is a positive form of mimetic 
desire" ("Violence, Difference, Sacrifice," p. 25).  Unlike Freud's Oedipal triangle, the triangle of 
mimetic desire offers a stable end point for the subject's desires, which would be a reciprocal bond of 
affection with the object, rather than a monopoly over the object's affections.  As an example, according 
to Girard, a person looking upon a "happy couple" sees "a couple's happiness which becomes the object 
of desire rather than either the man or the woman." ("Superman in the Underground," p. 1167).  In 
romantic relationships, mimetic desire can explain how a man's sexual desirability increases in 
proportion to the number of women who desire him, or how a woman's playing "hard to get" can make 
her even more desirable to a man even in the absence of a direct romantic rival (when a woman plays 
"hard to get," her body becomes the object of the man's desire and she herself becomes a mediator for 
that desire, or a rival for access to her own body).  Experience furnishes innumerable such "love 
triangles," and they have been re-enacted in romantic comedies from Shakespeare to the present day. 
  Jesus Christ is Girard's most favored model for benign mimetic desire; Girard notes that Christ's 
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pronouncements were also pattered upon ideas of mimetic desire.  On the subject of a human's 
relationship with God, Christ commands his followers to "love God the father through me," and in their 
relationships with other human beings, Christ counsels his followers to "desire for the other what the 
other desires for her or himself," otherwise known as the Golden Rule (emphasis in the original, 
"Violence, Difference, Sacrifice," p. 25).  Christ's understanding of how mimetic desire may be 
channeled into positive outlets engenders Girard's belief in Christianity as proclaiming a special truth 
distinct from other religions.  Unlike Buddhism, for example, which identifies and rejects mimetic 
desire completely, Christianity accepts mimetic desire as a key to building healthy relations with the 
self and with others.   
 Girard's focus in Violence and the Sacred, however, is violent conflict, one negative 
manifestation of mimetic desire.  For Girard, violent conflict can result from multiple subjects' rivalry 
with one another, and this conflict "snowballs" to involve more and more subjects, and violence among 
the rivals breaks out as the original object of desire is forgotten.   
 The first book of Homer's Iliad offers a prime example of how mimetic desire can generate the 
conflict which drives plot-action in literature.  The first book of the Iliad may begin belatedly, during 
the final days of the Trojan War, but this point of departure makes sense literarily because it is precisely 
at the inception of the fundamental conflict which will dominate the whole epic poem: "Begin, Muse, 
when the two first broke and clashed, / Agamemnon lord of men and brilliant Achilles" (Fagles, p. 77).  
To put an end to an arrow storm sent by Apollo, Agamemnon gives up Chryseis, a female war prisoner, 
to a priest of Apollo.  Agamemnon does not care about losing Chryseis herself, however, but only 
shows concern over the loss of prestige implied by the loss of his female prisoner.  So to assuage 
himself, Agamemnon chooses to replace Chryseis with Briseis, the female prisoner of Agamemnon's 
least favored commander, Achilles.  Achilles, too, acutely feels the loss of prestige which 
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Agamemnon's theft of the spoils of war causes him, which results in Achilles' desertion of 
Agamemnon's army for the duration of the war, at least until Achilles's brother-in-arms Patroclus is 
slain.  Such a system of apportioning spoils is wholly alien to our culture, which is perhaps why the 
director of the 2000 Hollywood movie Troy chose instead to imply a romantic liaison between Achilles 
and Briseis.  But even in Troy, the triangle of mimetic desire underpinning the conflict between 
Agamemnon and Achilles is immediately comprehensible: Briseis is valuable to Agamemnon only 
because his biggest rival, Achilles, also values her.  So although students of the Iliad may not receive a 
lesson in Rene Girard to go along with their reading, they have nonetheless been taught, quite correctly, 
that this conflict between Agamemnon and Achilles is not really over Briseis, but over the relative 
status of the two highest-ranking men in the Argive camp.   
 Achilles in the Iliad exemplifies another theory of Girard's: that literary figures become viewed 
as "divine" when their mastery over others exceeds normal human boundaries.  Violence is one symbol 
of such mastery, and Achilles can only prove himself equal in comparison with a "god" through 
extreme violence: 
  Achilles storming on with brandished spear 
  Like a frenzied god of battle trampling all he killed 
  and the earth ran black with blood.  (Fagles, Iliad Book 20, lines 557-559) 
If a hero's mimetic desire serves as the initiator of interpersonal conflict, and his ability to wield 
violence serves as the route to his sanctification in the eyes of other men, then he is a hero which 
Campbell's supposedly "universal" theory of the hero fails to account for.  For the Campbellian hero's 
journey model to work requires a hero opposite from Achilles in nearly every way; it demands a hero 
almost without an ego, willing to allow his desires to be determined by the demands placed upon him 
by his community, not by his own sense of personal gain or injured pride.  Campbell's account thus 
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works very well for Hector, a reluctant and noble warrior who wishes to "refuse the call" to action, but 
nevertheless takes up arms in defense of his family and city.  Campbell's model also accounts for 
Odysseus, who overcomes significant trials and temptations on his journey home to Ithaca to rescue his 
wife from her suitors.  Both these characters in the Iliad, however, serve as foils to Achilles; Odysseus 
is intelligent, well-spoken and well-liked; Achilles is entirely physical, boorish in speech, and feared by 
others.  Hector is married, a father, and genuinely desires peace for his nation, while Achilles deplores 
the idea of a stable home life and, in "Book 18: The Shield of Achilles," symbolically renounces peace 
forever and resolves to die young and glorious in combat.  Campbell's theory misses the mark, then, 
when asked to explain a hero such as Achilles, whose sphere of concern is much more egocentric, 
extending outwards only to his best friend Patroclus.   
 The Old and New Testaments of the Bible provide much different grounds for Girardian 
analysis.  In popular belief, the two testaments could not furnish a starker contrast in representing the 
relationship between man and god.  The God of the Old Testament is thought of as a "vengeful" God; 
He is at once the God of Noah who drowned a sinful world, the God of Moses who set forth the 
proscriptive list of taboos known as the Ten Commandments, and the God of Samson who killed a 
thousand men.  Yet the Old Testament also forecasts the model of Christian charity contained in the 
New Testament, and contains many stories which eschew the model of ritual sacrifice sometimes found 
in polytheistic religious cultures.   
 The story of Cain and Abel is one such Biblical example.  The shepherd Abel's ritual sacrifice of 
sheeps' fat pleases God, while God rejects the wheat offerings of the farmer Cain.  If one were to frame 
this story as a mimetic triangle, then the triangle would have Cain as the subject, God's affections as the 
object, and Abel as the mediator.  Yet it is clear that Cain does not truly desire God's affections, or he 
would not have resorted to the wrongful action of murder; instead, Cain desires to be in Abel's position, 
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prosperous enough to be able to afford such an animal sacrifice.  For if Abel were taken out of the story 
-- leaving only Cain desiring God's affections -- then nothing could have logically produced the 
jealousy required for Cain to commit such an act of violence.  After killing his brother, Cain replies to 
God "Am I my brother's keeper?", revealing that his mimetic jealousy for his brother has wrongly 
overridden his filial duties.   
 In a Girardian analysis, the Cain and Abel story presents a most interesting case.  For the story 
suggests that Abel's example, the ritual sacrifice of animals, serves as a positive alternative to Cain's 
example, the killing of other humans.  Yet Girard maintains that "Strictly speaking, there is no essential 
difference between animal sacrifice and human sacrifice, and in many cases one is substituted for the 
other." (Violence and the Sacred, p. 10).  I would argue instead that although the ritual structures 
underlying both practices have "no essential difference," the movement from human sacrifice to animal 
sacrifice represents a first step toward the total elimination of sacrifice as a ritual.  Cain's murder of 
Abel follows no ritual pattern, as it is divorced from God's wishes; however, the fate of Cain following 
his murder of Abel can be considered a matter of ritual, as God intervenes to make Cain's life valuable. 
 Consider God's response to Cain's fears that he will himself be murdered for his act of murder.  
God pronounces, "Not so, anyone who kills Cain will suffer vengeance seven times over.  Then the 
Lord put a mark upon Cain so that no one who found him would kill him." (Genesis 4:15).  In Romans 
12:19, God further clarifies his role as the final arbiter in cases of murder: "Vengeance is mine, I will 
repay," and in Proverbs 24:29, God says "Do not say: 'Just as he did to me, so I am going to do to him.  
I shall repay to each one according to his acting."  In taking responsibility as the deliverer of justice, 
God makes belief in himself incompatible with the concept of reciprocal violence.  So in the story of 
Cain and Abel, we see God intervening to put an end to the first Biblical instance of a potential spiral 
into reciprocal violence, a position to which He adheres remarkably and consistently over the course of 
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the Old and New Testaments.  So in Christianity, violence and the sacred remain unified, but the 
ancient ritual punishment of death for murder laid forth in Hammurabi's Code -- an eye-for-an-eye, a 
tooth-for-a-tooth -- is taken out of the hands of mortals and becomes a matter only for God to decide.   
 The binding of Isaac is another story which discredits the model of human sacrifice.  An angel 
of God tells Abraham that he must sacrifice his son Isaac.  Wrestling with this information, Abraham 
decides to carry through with God's commandment.  However, at the moment of crisis, God sends 
another angel to tell Abraham to spare his son, for God has been satisfied by Abraham's show of faith 
by carrying the rite this far.  The episode suggests that one need only demonstrate his faith in God; the 
duty to sacrifice one's own offspring to God is no longer required.  Later, Abraham finds a ram in a 
bush and sacrifices the ram to God instead; as in the Cain and Abel story, animal sacrifice is posited as 
a mode of sacrifice which can preserve peace among men.   
 In the New Testament, nonviolence as a doctrine of faith becomes more explicit, and it does so 
by reconfiguring the relationship between God and man.  In Jesus Christ, God's son, God finally 
becomes a man himself.  Not only do Christ's miracles cure lepers and feed the hungry, but He 
participates actively in the political struggles of men.  Like other Jews before him, Christ is sacrificed 
in a political pogrom by the Romans, and his scapegoating can be framed in terms of mimetic desire.  
Although posing no imminent political threat to the Romans, as His "kingdom is not on earth," Christ 
becomes a rival to Pontius Pilate as Christ's claim of divinity competes for the affections of the Roman 
subjects.  Yet the crucifixion of Christ only solidifies Christ's status as a symbol for resistance against 
the Roman regime.  At the moment of his death death on the cross, Jesus cries: "Father, why have you 
forsaken me?" vocalizing a feeling common to even the most faithful in their moments of persecution.  
Thus through Jesus, the Christian God becomes a personal god who, with absolute knowledge of 
human suffering, is able to walk alongside his faithful both literally and spiritually.  For Girard, this 
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personalization of God was one of the major innovations of Christianity, a breakthrough in 
reconfiguring prior notions of the relationship of the human and divine.  For Girard, Christian theology 
offers the possibility of ending the cycle of perpetual violence and obtaining a world-embracing state of 
peace. 
 When compared with the examples of more violent ritual practices cited by Girard in Violence 
and the Sacred, these Biblical stories indeed suggest that the Judeo-Christian God holds a relatively 
unique position in the pantheon of various cultures' gods.  It should be noted at this time that Girard 
was himself a Christian, and the desire to portray his own religion in a positive light may have 
informed his selection of examples.  Notwithstanding later violence committed in the name of 
Christianity such as the Crusades and the Inquisition, Christian theology as represented in the Bible 
appears convincingly in his analysis to be a religion tailored to liberal ideas of nonviolence and 
tolerance.   
 Yet Girard neglects to mention one glaringly obvious fact: the Christian myth contains at its 
own core a version of the violent scapegoat model he outlined.  The most fundamental tenet shared by 
Christians of every denomination is the belief that Jesus, the "Lamb of God," sacrificed himself on the 
cross so that the community of Christians may be forgiven of their sins, or, to use a Girardian term, 
"purified."  The example of Christ raises one possible exception to Girard's argument that Christianity 
differs fundamentally in its relationship to violence in "archaic" religions.  If God is willing to sacrifice 
his own son, then how should Christians be expected to put an end to the idea that men must be 
sacrificed?  Girard responds to this objection by noting that Christ's own agency propelled his sacrifice: 
  One has to make a difference between the sacrifice of others and self-sacrifice.  Christ  
  says to the Father: "you wanted neither holocaust nor sacrifice; then I said: 'Here I am.'"  
  In other words: I prefer to sacrifice myself than to sacrifice the other.  But this still has to 
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  be called sacrifice.  When we say "sacrifice" in our modern languages it has only the  
  Christian sense.  Therefore the passion is entirely justified.  God says: If nobody else is  
  good enough to sacrifice himself rather than his brother, I will do it.  Therefore I fulfill  
  God's requirement for man.  I prefer to die than to kill.  But all other men prefer to kill  
  than to die.  (Girard, "Apocalyptic Thinking after 9/11," p. 30).   
Again, the mimetic triangle offers a way out of this dilemma: Jesus says "love God through me."  In 
other words, Jesus offers himself as the mediator for Christians' desire for God, and so asks men to 
strive to imitate his own earthly example of peace and charity toward man.  Christians are asked to 
aspire to be "Christ-like," not to aspire to be "godlike" themselves.  For as the Iliad shows, to become a 
god-man, like Achilles, is to really become an animal-man.  Thus Christianity, for Girard, is different 
from archaic religions which employ human scapegoats in their rituals, as Christianity offers a novel 
conception of the pharmakos as a self-sacrificial figure, who by offering himself can end the cycle of 
reciprocal violence and ultimately re-humanize man.   
  
The Scapegoat Myth: Collective Violence Concealed 
"We know very little about the spontaneous mechanisms of collective violence, but we know enough to 
realize that these mechanisms do generate the type of collective delusion which our myths recognize as 
unquestionable fact."  
--Rene Girard, "Violence and Representation in the Mythical Text," p. 934 
  
 Rene Girard may be contrasted with Northrop Frye, in that Girard attempts to account for the 
origins of myth and ritual, while Frye only classifies patterns in which myth and ritual manifest 
themselves in literature.  I contend that Girard can explain better than Frye how and why the forces at 
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work in numerous episodes in the Bible, as well as Greek tragedies such as Oedipus Rex, are replicated 
throughout literature, even within Western literature not specifically influenced by Biblical or Greek 
sources.  Additionally, in Girard's view, the Bible is more than a source for symbols in Western 
literature; it also set forth a new social order which changed Western myth and ritual, and therefore 
literature, by precluding certain kinds of violence.   
 Girard categorizes violence into several categories.  The first is reciprocal violence, which is 
violence taken in response to another act of violence.  As we have seen, this is one kind of violence 
which the Judeo-Christian God repeatedly says that humans must reject.  Another kind is 
indiscriminate violence, an out-of-control kind of violence divorced from all notions of myth, ritual, or 
justice.  Unamious violence is a term which Girard uses synonymously with communal violence.  
Interestingly, for Girard, the kind of violence can, under certain conditions, cancel out the other.  
Unamious violence committed by the group's collective action can, for instance, put an end to the 
otherwise never-ending cycle of reciprocal killing.  But for such collective action to end the cycle of 
violence, rather than merely perpetuate the violent cycle, the violent action must be directed through 
certain rites of purification.  According to Girard, "The role of sacrifice is to stem this rising tide of 
indiscriminate substitutions and redirect violence into 'proper' channels." (Violence and the Sacred).  
And still nothing can guarantee the success of any ritual attempt at re-channeling this violence.  The 
priest, whom Girard compares to a nuclear power plant expert who must himself be decontaminated 
after decontamination, is himself not infallible; "accidents can always happen" (Violence and the 
Sacred, p. 41).  The lack of guarantees in this situation is troubling, and Girard admits that he has no 
clear answer: 
  The difference between sacrificial violence and nonsacrificial violence is anything but  
  exact; it is even arbitrary.  At times the difference threatens to disappear entirely.  There  
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  is no such thing as truly "pure" violence.   Nevertheless, sacrificial violence can, in the  
  proper circumstances, serve as an agent of purification. (Violence and the Sacred, p. 40)  
 Girard cites the example of the Greek myth of Heracles, a returning hero who is consumed by 
the flames of a rite of purification gone wrong; "the rite itself that unlooses the evil" (p. 41).  The evil 
occurs as a result of Heracles' having slain a centaur, whose inflammable blood has been spattered onto 
Heracles' shirt.  Blood, a universally recognized symbol of violence, follows the hero home to taint his 
household.  Perhaps a more recognizable modern example of this concept would be the 1982 Sylvester 
Stallone movie First Blood, otherwise known as Rambo.  The Vietnam "war hero" John Rambo returns 
to a small town in America and turns it into a replica of the war; the hero's return home thus becomes a 
return to war, not a return to peace, as his return "should" entail.  The film is unclear about the precise 
causes of Rambo's outburst, but there are multiple explanations.  A psychologist might explain Rambo's 
violent rampage in terms of post-traumatic stress disorder.  The mythic explanation, however, might 
hold that John Rambo, like Achilles, has already made a conscious decision to refuse to quietly adapt to 
peacetime, wishing to make it impossible for his home society to ignore the agony of war.  Rambo in 
this way becomes a personification for the literature of the victim, which calls its readers into 
questioning their base assumptions about the rightness of a cause pursued through violence.  This 
accounts more forcefully than a general psychological term like "post-traumatic stress disorder" for the 
guilt which war-makers must be prepared to accept when they send forth soldiers into combat.   
 Rambo and Heracles, who have killed, bear some responsibility for their actions and their 
ultimate fates.  However, one category of victim which myth acts to conceal is the pharmakos, or 
scapegoat.  The scapegoat must be an "arbitrary" victim, in the sense that his elimination will do 
nothing to solve the community's actual problems.  But Girard notes that in fact, through ritual, the 
community deludes itself into assigning the scapegoat a special significance; the community projects 
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its fears and hatreds onto the scapegoat.  Through myth and ritual the arbitrariness of the scapegoat 
must be concealed, and he must be transformed into a threatening figure capable of doing the worst 
harm and, through his death, of bestowing the highest good, or in Campbellian terms, bringing the 
"Ultimate Boon" to the community.   
 Oedipus Rex is the primary Greek mythological text which Girard uses as an example of the 
scapegoat mechanism, or of ritual violence in myth.  Girard argues that the plot sequence of Oedipus 
Rex, revolving around Oedipus's own acts of violence toward his mother and father, conceals the play's 
original act of violence, which was his father's decision to abandon the boy Oedipus on a hillside.  
Thus, Oedipus Rex does not regard the fact that Oedipus killed his father and slept with his mother as a 
fitting punishment for his parents' original act of violence, but instead the play slyly shifts the 
culpability for these actions of murder and incest onto Oedipus himself.  But if anything, Oedipus's 
crimes were foreshadowed by the fears of those in his community, chiefly his father Laius and the 
oracle which Laius consults before Oedipus's birth.  Girard notes, "it is the oracle that puts [ideas of 
patricide and incest] into Laius's head, long before Oedipus himself was capable of entertaining any 
ideas at all." (Violence and the Sacred, p. 175).  For Girard, Freud becomes a figure akin to the oracle, 
spreading the myths of patricide and incest throughout the culture, which cannot be beneficial, as "[t]he 
son is always the last to learn that what he desires is incest and patricide, and it is the hypocritical 
adults who undertake to enlighten him on this matter." (ibid., p. 175).   
 By blinding and exiling himself, Oedipus puts an end to the cycle of violent and "unnatural" 
acts, but by focusing upon his self-inflicted wounds, the audience, too, is blinded to the true origin of 
Oedipus's tragedy: his abandonment by his parents on a hillside.  Such may be "unjust," but Girard 
suggests that such mechanisms may sometimes function for the greater good.   
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Literature: Mimetic Desire & the Anti-Hero 
"There is more in Don Quixote to help a man like Nietzsche to retain his sanity than in all of psychiatry 
and psychoanalysis combined."   
--Rene Girard, "Superman in the Underground," p. 1173 
 
 Girard's theory of mimetic desire in literature can also be compared with Joseph Campbell's 
theory of the hero, for Girard shows how literary heroes can become metaphorically divine through 
their use of violence.  Girard goes further than Campbell, however, in also accounting for ways in 
which tragic heroes can be made into sacrificial figures, or pharmakoi, and in showing how thin is the 
line which can separate the hero's triumph from his disgrace.  Campbell's failure to account for 
examples of such heroic "disgrace" can be seen most evidently in the literature of the anti-hero, a genre 
of narrative which Girard's theory of mimesis can explain.   
 In an interview, Rene Girard proclaimed Miguel de Cervantes as the author "who contributed 
most... to the definition of mimetic desire."  ("Violence, Difference, Sacrifice: A Conversation with 
Rene Girard", p. 12).  Don Quixote rides forth to obtain fortune, fame, and Dulcinea's favor, not 
because he really desires any of these objects, but only because he wishes to count himself as a knight.  
He does what knights do because that's what knights do.  To prove himself, Quixote must triumph in 
combat with pretended or imagined rivals, and thus he must invent or imagine all sorts of pretexts for 
doing so.  His madness produces comedy, but it has also produced something far more significant: a 
new hero model.  In a more than literal sense, Don Quixote was not a hero in the way that others before 
him were heroes, and not only because Don Quixote is a madman.  Don Quixote may be literature's 
first example of an anti-hero, a literary character who acts independently of a fixed goal, takes no part 
in significant political struggles, and whose very existence means little or nothing for the society in 
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which he lives.  In short, an anti-hero contradicts everything in Joseph Campbell's theory about how all 
heroes act or should, by virtue of being merely average.  But I contend that the literature of the anti-
hero is no less valuable for eschewing Campbell's model; indeed, there are legitimate reasons why we 
should find tales of anti-heroes more entertaining, and even more morally instructive, than those 
featuring traditional heroes.  For with the anti-hero, literature descends from the exalted, immortal 
planes of myth and romance, and it begins to resemble life, with all its contradictory messages, shifting 
goals, and meaningless trivium.   
 For Girard, Don Quixote offers the best "cure" for Nietzsche's "insanity," because Quixote's 
knightly sallies humorize and trivialize the persecution complex built into Nietzsche's philosophical 
outlook.  "To Nietzsche as to Don Quixote, the greatest peril is the indifference of the world that his 
classical mixture of ego-and-other centeredness is bound to misinterpret.  [Nietzsche] constantly 
overestimates his own potential for scandal; he always exaggerates both the acceptability of his works 
and their lack of acceptability," writes Girard ("Superman in the Underground," p. 1173).  In other 
words, Nietzsche's me-against-the world mentality can be metaphorized as Don Quixote's tilting at 
windmills; the story of a man exaggerating his own role in fighting the forces of evil and world-
indifference only to see that his crusade is both illusory and vain.  History (Hitler, Stalin) and personal 
experience no doubt furnish readers with examples of other people who could learn Don Quixote's 
lesson, and such examples are what has led Girard to slyly proclaim that "when the ordinary people and 
the intellectuals do not agree, it is safer to go with the ordinary people."  ("Violence, Difference, 
Sacrifice," p. 16).   For although actions performed out of paranoia can serve as a source of humor 
when those actions fail, the same complex underlies the scapegoating mechanism, whereby "success" 
in the wrong hands has proven immensely destructive.   
 After Cervantes, literature has produced innumerable anti-heroes.  In the 19th-century, Gothic 
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fiction as well as the "Byronic hero" became important and popular archetypes.  The 19th-century 
Russian writer Mikhail Lermontov in his first novel A Hero of Our Time uses the Byronic hero 
archetype for Pechorin, a man incapable of loving who ruthlessly places his own interests above all 
else.   
 A Hero of Our Time is a title laden with irony, as Pechorin himself emerges as a despicable 
character, wholly unlike Campbellian notions of the literary "hero."  Scornful of his lovers and 
ungrateful to his friends, Pechorin dies a lonely death.  Unlike a Campbellian hero, Pechorin is not well 
known and celebrated by his society, but is instead only known to the world through the unnamed 
narrator's chance encounter with Maxim Maximych, Pechorin's friend from his Caucasian intrigue.  
Pechorin is also unlike traditional notions of the "anti-hero," however, often conceived as an "unlikely 
hero" with noble pretensions (such as Cervantes' Don Quixote).  Lermontov did not intend Pechorin as 
an object of ironic ridicule, however, but invested him with a conscious agency worthy of the reader's 
philosophical consideration.  Lermontov's complex development of his anti-hero's worldview is 
revealed in the pessimistic insights which Pechorin gives of himself, as seen in a conversation with 
Pechorin's love interest Princess Mary, reported in his diary: 
  I was ready to love the whole world -- none understood me: and I learned to hate...  
  Fearing mockery, I buried my best feelings at the bottom of my heart: there they died.  I  
  spoke the truth -- I was not believed.  I began to deceive.  (Lermontov 127) 
 
Such passages detailing the scope of Pechorin's depravity suggest that Pechorin, as a tragic anti-hero, 
has a greater level of emotional and social awareness than comic anti-heroes such as Don Quixote, but 
the problems Pechorin poses are no more serious.   
 Impulsive yet calculating, Pechorin describes himself as a man of a dual nature: "Within me 
there are two persons: one of them lives in the full sense of the word, the other cogitates and judges 
him" (Lermontov 163).  Pechorin believes that living a life of the "head" and not the "heart" has left 
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him friendless in the moments before his probable death, but at the same time, Pechorin shows no 
remorse, for he sees no value in becoming emotionally attached to human relationships.  For example, 
in Pechorin's kidnapping of Bela, Pechorin shows how he uses others for his own temporary pleasure.  
Although Pechorin makes continual attempts to win Bela's affections, when Bela's declaration of love 
for Pechorin is the exact moment when Pechorin decides he no longer desires Bela.  This episode 
reworks a traditional trope of chivalric Romance; Pechorin reverses the idea that knightly hero 
conquers an adversary in order to win the princess's love, instead revealing that the object of the 
princess's love has served only as an excuse to engage in rivalry.  Rather than accepting the girl's love, 
Pechorin's desire for Bela instead reveals itself as a desire only to triumph in her heart over Kazbich, 
Bela's brother, and in Girardian analysis, Pechorin's mimetic "rival" or "double."  Having achieved this 
mimesis-oriented, and ultimately self-regarding goal, Pechorin cuts himself off from Bela emotionally, 
showing little remorse even at Bela's death-bed. 
 Although the settings and circumstances of Pechorin's narrative are unique and exotic, 
Lermontov suggests that Pechorin's failures as a person are generalizable.  Lermontov appended to A 
Hero of our Time the statement that "[people] need some bitter medicine, some caustic truths," and 
suggested that critics responded harshly to Pechorin "perhaps, because there is more truth in this 
character than you would desire there to be" (2).  In these ways, Lermontov encourages his audiences 
to consider in what ways Pechorin is representative of a larger problem inherent in social relationships 
in all society.  So Lermontov, a Romantic who emphasized the individual above the social, here can be 
seen to adopt in A Hero of Our Time a surprising concern with the state of society.   
 If Pechorin's problems were merely social, however, then they would be fixable by societal 
change.  But Pechorin's pride, insatiable desire, an absence of purpose are, for Lermontov, inherent in 
his nature rather than a result of Russian decadence.  Evidence for Lermontov's attitude here can be 
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found in the fact that Pechorin's character remains remarkably static regardless of the society he 
inhabits; he slays a rival to seduce a Russian princess in just the same way as he slays a rival to seduce 
a Caucasian tribal girl.  Even if there were an Arcadia in A Hero of Our Time, one would expect 
Pechorin's arrival to produce an amorous intrigue followed by bloodshed.  Pechorin is thus, if anything, 
a threat to any potential social progress, not a potential instigator of that progress.  So rather than 
posing a solution in A Hero of Our Time, Lermontov poses just that problem: "The disease has been 
pointed out, goodness knows how to cure it!"  (2).  If Lermontov had known how to cure this "disease," 
then it is possible that Lermontov himself would not die in a duel at the young age of 26.  It is perhaps 
more likely that Lermontov had no desire to cure the "disease," only to make it visible, both in his most 
famous novel and in his death. 
 Lermontov himself -- along with Maxim Maximych, Bela, the unnamed narrator, and 
Lermontov's readers -- all feel a powerful attraction, one might even say a compulsion, to associate 
with Pechorin.   The Byronic anti-hero, although a failure as a moral exemplar, maintains a fascinating 
allure; the irony is that the social group created both within and outside the fictional narrative of A Hero 
of Our Time is centered around such an anti-social man.  Pechorin himself represented Lermontov's 
conception of flaws germane in himself and in the state of humanity.  Yet Lermontov also indicated that 
men such as Pechorin are in no way to be regarded as moral exemplars.  Pechorin ultimately holds no 
solutions for solving his own problems, let alone larger social problems, but A Hero of our Time, along 
with other stories featuring Byronic anti-heroes, serve as further documentation of the self-destruction 
and social danger posed by those who allow their desires to become framed by Girardian mimesis. 
 
The Modern World: Communal Violence Detached from Myth and Ritual? 
"You can see the shape of the apocalypse increasing every day: the power capable of destroying the 
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world, ever more lethal weapons, and the other threats that are multiplying under our eyes.  We still 
believe that all of these problems are manageable by man, but if you take them all together you can see 
that this is not the case.  They acquire a kind of supernatural value."   
--Rene Girard, "Apocalyptic Thinking after 9/11," p. 27 
 
 Girard identifies ways in which accepted cultural practices in our modern Western world have 
clearly diverged from tribal practices in ancient cultures.  For Girard, modern notions of literature prize 
originality and uniqueness; originality, like a fashion, is "in."  Unlike Campbell, however, Girard does 
not privilege the primitive lifestyle over the modern; instead, Girard argues that society has made true 
progress in many respects in eliminating reciprocal violence, or at least diverting its destructive nature 
into healthier channels.   
 Girard suggests that the widespread adoption of Christianity in Western culture has assisted in 
the pacification of Western societies over the centuries, comparing the relatively low levels of violence 
today with the high levels experienced in the 18th-century.  Girard attributes this reduction in violence 
to the separation of violence from the sacred, a separation which is rarely consciously acknowledged, 
but which has nonetheless permeated the culture to the degree that it is not even recognized as 
specifically Christian, but instead as constituting a part of "liberal" attitudes.  The Western schism 
between violence and the sacred, for Girard, has produced a curious split between self-professed 
Christian religious conservatives and secular liberals.  For example, Girard argues that the lynchings 
once frequently carried out by "Christians" in the Southern U.S. represent not Christian, but pre-
Christian, practices.  "Many people believe that Christianity is embodied by the South.  I would say 
that the South is perhaps the least Christian part of the United States in terms of spirit, although it is the 
most Christian in terms of ritual... You must define these lynchings as a kind of archaic religious act." 
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(Girard, "Apocalyptic thinking after 9/11," p. 31).  That such acts can be committed by self-proclaimed 
Christians, as well as secular liberals' condemnation of religious feuding as "religious violence," is for 
Girard an unfair charge against the whole of Christianity, which is in Girard's thought a religion 
devoted to the idea of ending this kind of reciprocal violence on the communal level.   
 Christianity, for Girard, can also offer an alternative to reciprocal violence on a more massive, 
world-ending scale.  While secular liberals sometimes charge that the history of violence committed in 
the name of Christianity has shown Christianity to be no different from other religions -- especially 
strains of radical Islam which currently practice terrorism and threaten world apocalypse -- Girard 
responds that this argument reflects a general misapprehension of Christian apocalyptic thought.   
Girard indicates that in Christianity, violence is actually understood to be a human trait, not a divine 
trait.  For in Revelations, according to Girard, "[t]here will be revolution and wars.  State will rise 
against state, nation against nation.  These are the doubles.  This is the power of anarchy we have now, 
with forces capable of destroying the whole world." (ibid., 26).  Thus Christianity differs from Islam, 
which in Girard's view "has many aspects of the Biblical religions minus the revelation of violence as 
bad, as not divine but human; it makes violence totally divine" (28).  For this reason Girard holds that 
"the 'mistake' of the first Christians was to believe that the apocalypse was going to be an instant 
affair," and thus Christianity initially failed -- but then succeeded through Paul's Letters to the 
Thessalonians -- to fully explain the ultimate secular, political source that threatens the eruption of 
world-ending violence.  In Biblical times the Roman Empire was the source; today, it is the balance of 
power and military advents of the world's nations -- nuclear and chemical weapons, etc. -- that both 
keep indiscriminate violence in check through the doctrine of "deterrence" while simultaneously 
allowing us to "see the coming of the apocalypse in a way that wasn't previously possible" (p. 26).  
However, for Girard, deterrence is a weak theory, for it entails "putting our faith in violence; we believe 
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that violence will keep the peace.  But this assumption is inevitably false.  We are trying not to think 
radically today about what this confidence in violence means" (ibid., p. 29).  So although the leaders of 
the "world community" have distanced themselves from smaller-scale, ritual violence, Girard 
concludes that peace founded upon "mutually assured destruction" reflects the same pattern of mimetic 
rivalry on a global scale, and thus can only be considered a temporary peace.  When the weapons used 
are capable of destroying the world, then the Christian apocalypse becomes inevitable.   
 Indeed, the mass slaughter of the 20th century is a result of the lack of religion's restraining 
presence on societal order.  Instead, the world's most destructive wars have resulted from an industrial-
scale monopolization of political power through the same primitive channels which Girard has 
identified.  Adolf Hitler's cult of personality, for example, while not formally religious, was based upon 
the familiar mythic structure of anti-Semitism, common in all areas of Christian Europe throughout the 
Middle Ages and fictionally represented in literature from this period.  Chaucer's Second Nun's Tale, for 
instance, a tale of 'blood libel,' follows this pattern set forth by Girard:   
  1) Something is wrong with the community.  Many people become ill and die   
  mysteriously.  The most sacred rules are transgressed; differences are erased; chaos  
  reigns. 
  2) The Jews have the "evil eye." The Jews commit the most unnatural actions such as  
  parricide, incest, etc.  Hostile as they are to the true faith, the Jews must be responsible  
  for whatever ails the community; a real plague, social agitation, etc.  Rumor has it that  
  some Jews have been tampering with the water supply.   
  3) Some Jews are killed or driven out. 
  4) Tranquility and order return to the community.  (Girard, "Violence and Representation 
  in the Mythic Text," p. 937) 
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 What is striking about Girard's systematization of the myth of anti-Semitism is how closely the 
structure parallels the hero's journey set forth by Campbell: "The accusations against the Jews are no 
less fantastic than the nefarious properties attributed to mythological heroes.  The two, in fact, are 
exactly the same: they include the evil eye, the plague, parricide, incest etc.  The circumstances are the 
same, and the sequence of events is exactly the same." (Girard, 937-939).  Perhaps the only difference 
between Campbell's and Girard's ways of retelling an anti-Semitic story in the heroic mode is that in 
Girard's recounting of the tale, the community rather than the individual hero takes action to restore the 
world to peace.   
 However, both Campbell's and Girard's accounts are similar in that other individuals within the 
community manage to escape responsibility for the victims' fate through the ritual of the pharmakos.  
The community can reap the rewards of violence while evading guilt through the tragic hero model, by 
sacrificing the returning hero who has taken action to purify or uplift the community.  Such a model is 
seen in the myth of Prometheus; mankind benefits from his transgression, but Prometheus alone is 
forced to suffer the punishment for stealing fire for the Gods.  Again, the Judeo-Christian Bible 
eschews the pharmakos ritual; the doctrine of original sin holds all of mankind responsible for Adam's 
and Eve's transgression in the Garden of Eden.   
 If the community, rather than the hero, takes collective violent action to defend itself from a 
perceived threat, then the responsibility for violence is diffused equally such that "justice" can only be 
served by punishing all, for in that case all have been tainted with the stain of violence, and all must be 
sacrificed to achieve purification.  Most modern literature, however, blurs the distinction between the 
individual's and the community's acts of violence.  For example, in the play The Children's Hour, a 
rumor started by Mary Tilford, a deceitful schoolgirl, spreads like wildfire through a prejudiced small-
town American community.  Mary Tilford scapegoats her headmistresses for her poor behavior at 
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school, claiming that "strange noises" from her headmistresses' bedrooms disturbed her.  The resulting 
obscenity trial and social ostracism cause the headmistresses to lose their jobs, leading finally to the 
suicide of the headmistress Martha Dobie, who, it is revealed, was in fact in a lesbian relationship with 
the other headmistress.   
 As an audience, we look for a scapegoat to blame for Martha's suicide, who deserves to be 
sacrificed?  Following Girard's predictions exactly, we feel as though the community cannot be purified 
until someone else's head rolls in the sand.  Yet The Children's Hour continually frustrates its 
audience's predisposition to assign blame either to the individual or the community.  Mary is actually 
ignorant of the fact that her rumor is true when she tells it, and her grandmother, possessing a greater 
social status and more credibility than this deceitful girl, is far more instrumental than Mary in 
amplifying and legitimating the rumor.  The grandmother's retelling of her granddaughter's rumor, 
however, could not have infected others in the community unless the community, too, was predisposed 
to accept the rumor due to its own anti-gay prejudices.  Even Martha's partner apparently shares in the 
blame, by emotionally retreating from Martha and pulling up the drawbridge in her hour of desperation. 
 As the play ends, the scapegoat is dead, but instead of helping atone for her community's flaws, 
Martha's death only reveals them.  So The Children's Hour shows a new tragic model at work, far 
removed from the tragic model of Oedipus Rex or Shakespearean tragedy, which feature tragic heroes 
who in one way or another "deserve" their fate, and whose deaths instruct others, heralding a new order 
or the promise of a new order.  Martha's death shows the community's lack of justice, and lack of 
progress, and perhaps explains how The Children's Hour lacks a sense of catharsis and proves so 
deeply unsettling.  Is The Children's Hour therefore more or less "tragic" than Oedipus Rex?  If we do 
decide that The Children's Hour is the more tragic play, then we will likely do so because in The 
Children's Hour the tragic irony is greater; only the audience is instructed by Martha's death, while the 
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community learns nothing. 
 Real world examples of this tension between individual and collective responsibility for 
violence -- influenced as they are necessarily by our own identities and prejudices -- can be far more 
partisan.  Such was the dilemma facing the judges of the Nuremberg Trials as they attempted to assign 
culpability for the Holocaust, dramatized in the 1961 film Judgment at Nuremberg.  Hans Rolfe, the 
defense lawyer for accused German judges who enforced Nazi laws, gives an impassioned speech 
raising the fairness of prosecuting these judges at Nuremberg rather than others who arguably shared 
guilt.  How guilty was Churchill, who declared as late as 1938 that Britain deserved a leader like 
Hitler?  How responsible were the American industrialists who built war materiel which was sold to 
Germany before the outbreak of World War II?  How responsible was the whole world for standing by 
as Hitler took Czechoslovakia and Austria?  The German barrister's questions turn an American 
audience's traditional feelings of responsibility for the Holocaust on its head, a juxtaposition which 
only Girard's theory accounts for.  So while Girard explains, Campbell places all the agency on the 
individual hero, who is then sanctified, not sacrificed, by the community, despite the violence the hero 
has taken toward others.     
 In the Nazi Germany permutation of this anti-Semitic theme, Hitler, as the leader of the Nazi 
Party, can be conceptualized in Girard's terms as holding the position of the "Aryan" tribe's priest.  
Through the Nazi Party's rhetoric, Jews were ritually dehumanized, and through their policies, the Jews 
were taken captive as prisoners of the Germans.  Then the activities of the Holocaust -- concentration 
camps, extermination camps -- physically separated the Jews from German society and made the Jews, 
along with members of other "foreign" groups such homosexuals and Gypsies, into sacrificial victims.  
Hitler even termed this activity the "Final Solution" to the Jewish question, who came to bear the blame 
for all Germany's problems.   
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 Notwithstanding the political propaganda deriving from "scientific" proofs of Aryan superiority, 
the "non-religious" or even "anti-religious" Nazi movement was at its heart a battle over the sacredness 
of Germany.  In other countries, similar cults coalesced around Mao Ze Dong, China's "ritual 
sacrificer" of capitalists, Joseph McCarthy, America's "ritual sacrificer" of communists.  This dynamic 
underpins even the formally religious cult surrounding Kim Il-Song and his descendents, perhaps the 
last temporal rulers in the world who are still regarded by their subjects as divine. 
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Conclusion 
 Literature is shaped by the direct experience of the author; in turn, the author's words have an 
impact on those around him or her.  Sometimes the experience related through the narrative is a 
common experience which serves as a cultural touchstone; common examples in our cultural reservoir 
include prom night, marriage, or (more prosaically) a trip to Wal-Mart.  At other times, the author 
relates a unique experience, such as a war journal or an account of living with Samoans.  Either way, an 
author's narrative becomes a tool not only for the entertainment of the audience, but also for organizing 
the way her audience perceives reality.  Literary theorists following in the tradition of the myth-ritual 
school have explored the interrelatedness of narrative and psychology, but critics like Joseph Campbell, 
and the Northrop Frye of The Anatomy of Criticism, did not probe far enough in this direction.  For 
with the power to alter consciousness comes a responsibility to closely examine the kinds of messages, 
however subliminal, such narratives contain.  Narratives which can make a claim to "universality" -- 
Campbell's Hero's Journey, or Frye's genre wheel of myth-romance-satire -- deserve particular scrutiny, 
for any messages contained therein could be continually transmitted and reinforced without our 
conscious knowledge.    
 With each passing year of artistic production, Frye's theory of literature as a "unified whole" 
seems to make less and less sense.  New kinds of stories are being told in new forms -- documentaries, 
memoirs, YouTube videos -- and on a wider scale than previously.  One historical event in particular 
appears to have been instrumental in transforming our outlook on the world.  The Holocaust in Nazi 
Germany has laid bare to all citizens of the world, not just scholars of myth and ritual, the horrendous 
acts which the abuse of one aspect of narrative -- the scapegoating mechanism -- can produce.  Yet the 
Holocaust is, sadly, only differentiated from other historical examples of ritual sacrifice in the size, 
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scope, and intensity of the destruction it inflicted upon its victims.  Every year brings a new tragedy of 
ritual violence, and the international community's resolution of "never again" has been continually 
thwarted by recent genocides -- East Timor, Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Darfur, among others.  Adolf 
Hitler was only of many fanatical leaders who have seized upon this potent avenue of psychological 
control: the mindset of demonization. 
 It is my contention that the fields of literature and literary criticism, when they intersect with 
politics, should help reveal this dangerous impulse towards violence within the human heart -- as 
Girard's theory does -- not concealing or glorifying it, as does a thinker like Joseph Campbell.  To 
safeguard the progress our civilization has made so far, and to leave an even safer, more tolerant society 
for our descendents, we will need a theory of literature which unambiguously accounts for the origins 
of fundamentally evil human impulses, so that we may recognize and learn how to thwart such 
atrocities before they ever take place.  
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